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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Unreasonable Search and Seizure-
Compelled Production of Tax Records
Congress, as an incident' to the exercise of its power to "lay and
collect taxes on income,"'2 has granted to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue authority to summon witnesses, examine and compel produc-
tion of tax records. Upon failure of the taxpayer or witness to appear
or to produce books, papers, records and memoranda, the district court
may order an examination or issue a subpoena duces tecum compelling
compliances with the demands of the Commissioner.
There is the utmost need for such investigatory powers in order to
avoid reducing the collection of income taxes to a voluntary basis. Yet,
in the ordinary exercise of these important powers of inquiry into tax
matters it is inevitable that the information elicited at times will assume
a scope and nature which contravene the principles of the Fourth4 and
Fifth Amendments.5 Although a subpoena duces tecum lacks many of
the aggravating incidents of an actual search and seizure, it contains
many of the same features and accomplishes substantially the same
purpose. Boyd v. United States6 held that compelling one to produce
his private papers which incriminate him7 was an unreasonable search
and seizure. The rationale of the Boyd case was affirmed and extended
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I § 8: "The Congress shall have power to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."
'U. S. Cowsr. AmEND. XVI.
'The Constitutional validity of authorizing the courts to use their process
in aid of inquiries before administrative agencies has been firmly established.
Such a provision does not confer non-judicial -powers on the courts but is a case
or controversy to which the judicial power of the United States extends. Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . .
a"... nor shall any person . .. be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. .. ."
116 U. S. 616,622,624 (1886): "A compulsory production of a man's papers
to establish a criminal charge against him or to forfeit his property is within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in all cases in which a
search and seizure would be.. ..
"... and we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such suit is
compelling him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of . . . an unreasonable
search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
'Use of the Fourth Amendment in aid of the Fifth has led to severe criticism
of the Boyd case. Eg. see 8 WIGuORE, EVIDENCE §2264 p. 363 (3d ed. 1940).
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in Hale v. HenkelS which declared that a subpoena duces tecum may
constitute an unreasonable search because of the broad sweep and indefi-
niteness of its demands. There can be little doubt that these objections
will continue to be raised at least so long as tax books and records are
construed by the courts as having the status of "private papers."
The question of whether tax books and records are to be considered
private or public papers has been highlighted by Shapiro v. United
States.9 This decision, if extended by the courts, will have far reaching
effect on the administration of internal revenue laws. Defendant,
Shapiro, was tried on charges of having made tie-in sales in violation
of the regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act. Having
previously been compelled by subpoena duces tecum to produce his
sales records and having raised timely objection, defendant made a plea
in bar claiming immunity from prosecution based on Section 202(g)
of the Act.' 0
The majority-" held that the immunity provision was intended as a
substitute or compensation for what would otherwise have been the
constitutional privilege of the witness ;12 hence where no constitutional
8201 U. S. 43 (1903).
335 U. S. 1 (1948).
0 "No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under
this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity
provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 ... shall apply
with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege."
The Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 provides: "No person shall be excused
from attending and testifying or from producing 'books, papers . . . before the
Interstate Commerce Commission or in obedience to the subpoena of the Com-
mission . . . on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him ...
But no person shall be prosecuted ... for or on account of any transaction, matter
or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, before said Commission or in obedience to its subpoena ....
11 The decision was five to four with three dissenting opinions. The majority
based its decision on Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913) and Wilson
v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911). The former held that the provisions of
immunity statutes have no application to the production of documents where no
constitutional privilege exists. The latter held that the constitutional privilege,
which exists as to private papers may not be validly asserted as to corporate
records required by law.
Since the Wilson case it can be said generally that corporate records are
"public" and amenable to process if operations are carried on in areas appro-
priately subject to government regulation. This view however, does not cut down
the scope of the Fifth Amendment because the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal one, applying only to natural persons. It cannot
therefore be utilized by or on behalf of a corporation. United States v. White,
322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944).
1 The Court quoted from Holmes, J. in the Heike case: "... the obvious
purpose of the statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that other-
wise could not be got. We see no reason for supposing that the Act offered a
gratuity to crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow the
construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the privilege
of the person concerned." 335 U. S. 1, 19 (1943). See also Councilman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U. S. 547 (1891).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
privilege existed, no immunity could be granted. 13 Prosecution and con-
viction of defendant was upheld because he had no constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the sales records since they were "re-
quired by law to be kept"' 4 and had "public aspects."'' 5
That the required records doctrine, if extended, will have appli-
cability to tax matters16 is evidenced by the Codei 7 and Regulations' s
which require records to be kept.19 Although the Shapiro case was con-
cerned mainly with the Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination), to which
the scope of this writing extends only incidentally,20 it is obvious that if
records required by law to be kept are construed as being so "public"
in nature that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
inapplicable, 2 1 then such construction would eliminate unreasonable
"Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 20 (1948).§14 of Maximum Price Regulation 426, 8 FED. REG. 9546, 9548-49(1943)
provides: "Records. (a) Every person subject to this regulation shall . . .pre-
serve for examination by the Office of Price Administration all his records ...
or other written evidences of sale or delivery which relate to the prices charged
pursuant to the provisions of this regulation ... shall keep and make available for
examination ... records of the same kind which he customarily kept, relating
to prices ... "
' ". . . it cannot be doubted that -the sales record which petitioner was
required to keep as a licensee under the Price Control Act has 'public aspects.'"
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 34 (1948).
" Mr. Justice Frankfurter raises this possibility in his dissenting opinion.
335 U. S. 1, 54 (1948).
I
7 1NT. Rav. ConE §54(a).
'
8 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.54-1 (as amended by T. D. 5381, 1944 Cum. BuL.
188). "Every person subject to the tax ... shall, for the purpose of enabling
the Commissioner to determine the correct amount of income subject to tax,
keep such permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are suf-
ficient to establish the amount of the gross income and the deductions, credits and
other matters required to be shown in any return.... The books or records re-
quired by this section shall be kept at all times available for inspection by internal
revenue officers and shall be retained so long as the contents thereof may become
material in the administration of any internal revenue law." Cf. §14 of. Maximum
Price Regulation 426 quoted in part in note 14 supra which is the basis of the
decision in the Shapiro case.
'
0 See 27 TAXES 639 (1949).
.0 Generally on quasi-public records and self-incrimination, see Note, 47 CoL.
L. REv. 838 (1947). Also Note, 24 Ind. L. J. 567 (1949), 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE§2259c (3d ed. 1940) (See list of cases cited in 1949 Pocket Supplement in par-
ticular).
2X Whether the privilege against self-incrimination actually exists as to the
production of an individual's tax records has not been authoritatively decided. In-
deed, there is a striking scarcity of cases squarely on the point. See Internal
Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 D.C. N.Y. (1923). Also United States
v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931). As a practical matter, if such privilege exists,
it would seem wise that Congress enact an immunity provision similar to that
accompanying virtually all the major regulatory statutes. For a list of enactments
containing such immunity clause, see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6(1948). The Bureau is primarily in the business of collecting taxes, not of
punishing criminals and its task at best is a most difficult one without the added
complication of a constitutional privilege to hinder its enforcement of the revenue
laws. An immunity provision gets evidence to aid tax collection and amnesty is
granted for offenses which in many instances are- not provable anyway.
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search and seizure22 as a defense to a subpoena duces tecum compelling
production of those records. Especially is this true since a demand
of records so public would clearly be a reasonable search. If taxpayers'
records are by judicial interpretation made "public" it may be that
government officials charged with administering the revenue laws will
have an inherent power to examine those records whether relevant to
any matter under investigation or not. Until such characterization is
made, however, the cry of "fishing expedition" will continue to be raised
and extensive analysis of the statutes will be necessary to ascertain the
scope of the inquisitorial powers granted.
Are the present Code provisions susceptible of an interpretation
which permits an unreasonable search and seizure? The Commissioner,
after refusal of a taxpayer or third party to comply with his demands,
may petition2 3 the district court 24 to order an examination or compel
production of books of account. The investigation must be for the
purpose of "ascertaining the correctness of a return" or "making a re-
turn where none has been made." 2 5 Further, the petition must identify
22 Mr. Justice Frankfurter poses the question of whether the majority holding
does not in fact make a man's home a "public library." In pointing out the ex-
treme consequences to which the decision may lead, he says: "Moreover, the
Government should be able to enter a man's home to examine or seize such public
records, with or without a search warrant, at any time." Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U. S. 1, 54, 55 (1948). It may be urged that such conclusion does not
necessarily follow. Even though the word "papers," as used in the Fourth Amend-
ment (see note 4 .tpra) means "private papers" there is still the "right of
the people to be secure in their houses." The sanctity of a man's home would
require the use of appropriate and orderly process to get access to those records.
A subpoena duces tecum is one such appropriate process. But see Davis v.
United States. 328 U. S. 582 (1946).
2 "Petition" is in form a complaint and is governed by Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128
F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
2 INT. REv. CoDE §3633(a) : "If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data,
the district court of the United States for the district in which such person
resides shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data."
INT. REV. CODE §3615(e) : "Whenever any person summoned under this section
neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to give testimony or to answer inter-
rogatories as required, the collector may apply to the judge of the district court
• ..for an attachment against him as for contempt."
See It re Wolrich, 84 F. Supp. 481 (D.C. N.Y. 1949).
"INTq. REv. CoDE §3614 (a) : "The Commissioner, for the purpose of ascer-
taining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return
where none has been made, is authorized, by any officer ... designated by him
for that purpose, to examine any books, papers, records or memoranda bearing
tipon the matters required to be included in the return, and may require the
attendance of the person rendering the return ...or the attendance of any other
person having knowledge in the premises, and may take his testimony with
reference to the matter required by law to be included in such return. . ."
Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1940) aff'd. 128 F. 2d
731 (9th Cir. 1942). McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F. 2d 838 (5th Cir. 1938). See S
MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATON §47.44 et seq. (ed. 1943).
[Vol. 29
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the books, papers, and records with reasonable particularity 26 as having
a "bearing upon matters required to be included in the return"2 7 or as
"respecting any objects or income liable to tax or the returns thereof." 28
Since the statute clearly limits the investigatory power to matters bear-
ing on the income tax liability of a taxpayer and the provisions are so
defined and limited to this legitimate purpose, there can be no basis for
an interpretation so broad as to permit an unreasonable search and
seizure. If the records demanded are not reasonably identified as bear-
ing on the tax liability of the person whose return is being investigated,
the statute is not complied with and the subpoena is unenforceable, not
because it imports an unreasonable search but because it is beyond the
pale of the statutory grant. 29 The provisions of the quoted statutes are
the measure of the Commissioner's power and an investigatory proceed-
ing which does not comply with the requirements therein, is a wholly
unauthorized assumption of inquisitorial powers.30 Hence, to hold that
a subpoena duces tecum or an examination is a "fishing expedition ' 31
and thus an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment is to violate one of the cardinal rules of constitutional
decision.3 2
A much more difficult question arises in ascertaining what is a
"reasonable" time during which books of account may be examined or
their production compelled. After the passage of a reasonable time it
may be argued with force that any search would constitute an unreason-
able search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. There is no
express statutory time limitation on examination and production of
2 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F2d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1947). See
also United States v. Union Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
INT. REv. CODE §3614(a), quoted supra note 25.2 INT. REv. CODE §3615(a).
"Under this view a corporation is entitled to protection by the courts against
a broad search, quite apart from the question of whether a corporation may be
protected by the Fourth Amendment itself. There are cases which indicate that
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure applies to corporations as
well as individuals. E.g. see Hale v. Henkel, 281 U. S. 43, 76(1906).
A measure which gave the Commissioner powers wide enough to investigate
records for any -purpose was deleted by Congress. See 26 U.S.C.A. §1544 and
note (1935) ; also Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1934).
0See Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596(W.D. Pa. 1934), First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 160 F.2d 532(5th Cir. 1947), In re International Corporation Co.,
5 F. Supp. 608(S.D. N.Y. 1934).
"Federal Trade Comm'n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924), Ellis
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 237 U. S. 434 (1915). See note 44 infra.
""The court will not pass upon a Constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. The rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction ... the court will decide
only the latter." J. Brandeis concurring in Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S.
288, 347 (1936).
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books and records. However, there would seem little need for any
examination beyond the ordinary limitation period on assessment.88
There are exceptions, of course, where no return has been filed or where
fraud is involved in the return 4 or where as much as twenty-five per-
cent of the tax due has been omitted.8 5 In these cases the ordinary limi-
tation on assessment is not applicable, and there may arise a need for
examination and production of records in order to determine a tax
deficiency. In view of the Congressional mandate against unnecessary80
examinations and the utter futility of examining records to "ascertain
the correctness of a return" at a time when there can be no further
assessment, the Commissioner should set forth in his complaint suffi-
cient allegations8 7 to toll the ordinary statute of limitations on assess-
ment. The allegation of reasonable suspicion of fraud88 has been held
" IxT. Ray. CODE §275(a): "The amount of income taxes imposed by this
chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no
proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall
be begun after the expiration of such period."
" INT. REv. CoDE §276 (a) : "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return the tax may be assessed, or
a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assess-
ment at any time."
" INT. REv. CoDE §275(c) : "If the taxpayer omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the
amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a pro-
ceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment,
at any time within 5 years after the return was filed."
" INT. REv. CoDE §3631: "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary
examinations or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of
account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests other-
wise or unless the Commissioner, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in
writing that an additional inspection is necessary."
This section has been construed as a limit on the power of the Commissioner.
Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942), First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947). See also Pacific Mills v.
Kenefick, 99 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1938): "The first provision amounts to a
Congressional safeguard of the taxpayer's right not to be harrassed by unneces-
sary examinations. This right is stated in absolute terms. The other part of the
section is more explicit and limits the number of examinations to one per year
unless the Commissioner certifies that more are necessary,-a safeguard against
oppressive action by subordinate officials. Every presumption is to be made in
support of the Commissioner's action. But he clearly has no right to impose
additional examinations in disregard of the statute, i.e. unnecessary in the per-
formance of his duty as Commissioner. A second examination ordered by the
Commissioner without any necessity therefor is an arbitrary abuse of power."
But cf. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1933).
A deficiency assessment is not illegal because facts forming the basis of assess-
ment were obtained through alleged illegal second examination. Phillip Magone
Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 168, 172 (Ct. Cms. 1931), Glassell v. Comm'r, 42
F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1930).
"7 Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
" In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804, 806. 807 (D. Md. 1937), Martin v. Chandis
Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir 1942). Some showing of fraud is necessary
to justify examination; In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Snpp. 304 (E.
D. N.Y. 1941); Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1936). But see
United States v. United Distillers Prod. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
sufficient to warrant further examination, thus, not relegating the Com-
missioner to actual proof of fraud. The theory here is that examination
is allowed in order to ascertain whether fraud exists so that further
assessment can be made.
Where, however, there is no allegation of fraud or reasonable sus-
picion thereof, and the statutory period of assessment has run, courts
have held that a subpoena duces tecum compelling production of books
and records is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 39 It may well be argued that this is not a necessary
result.40 If indeed, on the facts the courts feel constrained to disallow
further examination and production of records, the result can be reached
on statutory grounds. A fair interpretation of §3614(a) 4 . construed
in conjunction with §363142 leads to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to authorize examination and production of books only when
necessary and relevant to "income liable to tax." The assessment
period having passed, there exists neither the liability nor the necessity,
absent a tolling of the statute. Thus the courts' decisions under such
circumstances can rest on lack of power under the statutes rather than
on unreasonable search and seizure.
As a practical matter it would seem that where a taxpayer has
duly made his return and paid the tax, and the statutory time limit for
further assessment has passed, there should be no further required
examination by the Commissioner unless there is prima facie some good
reason therefor.43 While the courts should not unduly circumscribe
the investigatory powers permitted the Commissioner in the perform-
ance of his highly important duties, such powers are not thus unduly
restricted. If "necessity" exists there can be no hardship in requiring
a showing thereof to the court.
As to the manner of asserting the defense, a taxpayer whose books
are demanded may refuse to comply with a blanket subpoena or "fish-
ing excursion" 44 and when resort is had to the courts for enforcement,
See also In re Upham's Estate, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) ; In re Keegan,
18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) ; In re Paramount Jewelry Co., 80 F. Supp. 375
(S.D. N.Y. 1948).
"It re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937) (involved oral testimony
concerning books and papers) ; Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
A valid basis for decision in these cases is set out in, Martin v. Chandis Securities
Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
4o See note 32 supra. " See note 25 supra. " See note 36 supra.
" Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D. Cal. 1940)
cited with approval in First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1947).
... as when the person served is required to fetch all his books at once to
an exploratory investigation whose purposes and limits can be determined only
as it proceeds." McMann v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377 (2d
Cir. 1937).
See also United States v. Union Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
he may then set up his objections. Similarly a third person so sum-
moned may insist upon unreasonableness and lack of statutory power as
grounds for a court's refusal to enforce the Commissioner's order;
but neither may test the validity of an order by securing an injunction
to restrain its enforcement against himself."5 The courts have little
difficulty with the issues thus raised regardless of the theory on which
the decision is based.
Considerable -difficulty is experienced, however, when a taxpayer
attempts to restrain, or prevent by injunction4 6 or otherwise, 47 an
allegedly wrongful examination of a third party's books. In this instance
the taxpayer should not be afforded a remedy on any theory. He has no
proprietary interest in the records and therefore, there can be no search
and seizure which will be an invasion of his property rights.48 Further,
there is no beyond-the-statute ground to give him relief. If the demands
made by the Commissioner are unlawful, and therefore unenforceable,
but the third party who might object has not done so, this is no more
open to objection by the taxpayer than a voluntary furnishing of infor-
mation by any third party would be.
THoMAs H. SUDDARTH, JR.
'" Caplis V. Helvering, 4 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. N.Y. 1933); Zimmerman v.
Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939) ; It re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y.
1937); In re Upham's Estate, 18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937); Cooley v.
Bergen, 27 F.2d 930 (D.C. Mass. 1928). See 9 MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §49.171 n. 71 (ed. 1943).
"Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) is an example of the
dilemma in which a court may find itself as a result of being too ready to decide
a constitutional question. Held: The taxpayers for whom the limitation period
on assessment had run, not the brokers whose records were being demanded, were
the real and aggrieved parties and that they might therefore enjoin what the
court called an unreasonable search protected by the Fourth Amendment. The
court, feeling that further examination would be an unreasonable search, bumped
squarely into the well established principle that only the owner of property may
object. (See note 48 infra.) It based its decision however, on the idea that the
taxpayers had some sort of property right in the information contained in the
broker's records. See Notes, 45 YALE L. J. 1523 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
789 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 904 (1936). The court, bothered by lack of
an allegation of fraud to toll the limitation on assessment, and feeling that further
examination should not be allowed, could have avoided the "property concept"
hurdle by a decision on statutory grounds. However, the embarrassment of the
decision was relieved somewhat when on remand, evidence was taken which
showed reasonable grounds to suspect fraud and the bill was dismissed. See 25
F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1938). This time on appeal the court retreated to the
sound position that only the owner of property may object. "Agents may not
under official pretext but in fact officiously, extend their powers beyond those
provided by law. If they attempt to examine unrelated transactions, or to
engage in an irrelevant "fishing expedition" . . . they may be restrained by the
court to whom application is made to enforce compliance." 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.
1939). See Note, 28 GEo. L. J. 120 (1939).
""ln re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1937), In re Upham's Estate,
18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
"The principle is well established that only the owner of the books and papers
has a standing to object to a search as being an unreasonable search. Esgee Co.
v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 158 (1923), Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,
69 (1906), Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1927), Graham v.
United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926).
[Vol.2
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Automobiles-Turning and Stopping-Signals by Driver
A truck, operated by defendant company, and a motorcycle, driven
by plaintiff's intestate, were proceeding in the same direction on a city
street, the motorcycle following the truck. The truck driver, without
looking in his rear view mirror, made a hand signal for a left turn which
it appears was not continued for the last fifty feet traveled; and then
"angled" left towkrd the driveway entrance to defendant's plant. The
motorcycle struck the left side of the truck near the front when the
truck was several feet from the entrance to the driveway, causing the
death of the motorcycle driver. Motion to nonsuit plaintiff denied.
Verdict for plaintiff. Held, in Ervin v. Cannon Millsl trial court's rul-
ing affirmed.
This decision focuses attention on the issues inherent in motor vehicle
accidents growing out of turning and stopping without adequate signal.
The ordinary situation is one in which the vehicle turning or stopping is
hit from the rear by the vehicle immediately following. N. C. GEN STAT.
§20-154 states the important rules for signals upon stopping or turning.2
The driver following has the advantage of the rule that its violation is
negligence per se.3 Therefore a showing of violation of the statute
coupled with proof of causal connection between the violation and the
injury establishes actionable negligence.4 Hence if it is admitted that
defendant violated the statute-which led to the accident-his chances
of winning depend on a showing of contributory negligence.
On the other hand, the person who is charged with negligent
stopping or turning has the benefit of N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-152, which
'233 N. C. 415 (1951).
- "(a) The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting, stopping or
turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in
safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such
movement, shall give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicle, of the intention to make such a movement.
"(b) The signal herein required shall 'be given by means of the hand and arm
in the manner specified, or by any mechanical or electrical signal device approved
by the department, except that when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to
prevent the hand and arm signal from being visible, both to the front and rear, the
signal shall be given by a device of a type which has been approved by the depart-
ment.
"Whenever the signal is given the driver shall indicate his intention to start,
stop or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the left side of the
vehicle as hereinafter set forth.
"All signals to be given from left side of vehicle during last fifty feet traveled."
N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-154 (1949 Supp.).
For the rules on the technique of making a turn, see N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-153
(1943).
Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950) ; Conley v. Pearce Young-Angel Co.,
224 N. C. 211, 29 S.E. 2d 740 (1944) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E.
2d 311 (1939).
'Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 365 (1942)
Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950).
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declares that "(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent with regard to the
safety of others and due regard to the speed of such vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway... ."G Its violation also
constitutes negligence per se.6 The turning driver may also rely on the
statutory duty of a passer to sound his horn,7 if not within a business
or residential district, the breach of which is "negligence."8
Although N. C. GEN STAT. §20-154 is stated in terms of an absolute
twofold duty (1) to turn only after driver has first seen that the move-
ment can be made in safety, (2) to give the proper signal whenever
the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement;
yet it has been construed to require only the exercise of reasonable care
to see if movement can be safely made, and to require the giving of a
signal only when "surrounding circumstances afford him reasonable
grounds for apprehending that his turn ...might affect the operation
of another vehicle." 9 Hence the law does not require a driver to signal
every time he turns, nor &ioes it demand infallibility of his judgment of
the proper occasion to signal. The most extreme application of this view
is in Stovall v. Ragland.o There plaintiff turned left from the high-
way into his private driveway-1 without giving a signal of any descrip-
tion and collided with defendant who was apparently in the act of pass-
ing him. Plaintiff was held to have satisfied the statutory duty by his act
of looking in his rear view mirror. Accordingly the court held that the
trial judge erred in calling plaintiff's conduct negligent as a matter of
law on a motion to nonsuit him. The result of this decision and the
interpretation of the statute may be to deprive the statute of much of
its precautionary value. As a practical matter the effort required to give
a signal in every case as an alternative to current dependence on the
driver's "reasonable" decision in each case as to when one is necessary,
'Subsection (b) of this statute states: "The driver of any motor truck, when
traveling upon a highway outside of a business or residence district, shall not
follow another motor truck within three hundred feet, but this shall not be con-
strued to prevent one motor truck from overtaking and passing another." N. C.
GEx. STAT. §20-152 (1949 Supp.).
"Murray v. A. C. L. R. R., 218 N. C. 392. 11 S. E. 2d 326 (1940).7 N. C. GEIT. STAT. §20-149 (1943), relied on in Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C.
536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937) ; held inapplicable in the Ervin v. Cannon Mills case
because in business district.
8 Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937).
' Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 536, 58 S. E. 2d 115, 117, (1950).
10211 N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 2d 899 (1937). "The plaintiff having looked in
both directions and having observed no automobile or other vehicle approaching
from either direction, was under no obligation, by virtue of the statute, to give
any signal of his -purpose to turn to the left and enter the driveway of his home."
(p.1539)
' It would seem that greater precaution should be exercised by the driver
turning into a private driveway than at an intersection where turning is more to
be expected.
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is slight compared to the number of accidents it would prevent. Some
decisions of the North Carolina court, however, indicate that this
statutory duty may not be so flexible as it might seem.' 2 It has been
said that "He [the driver] is held to the duty of seeing what he ought
to have seen."'38
The principal case (Ervin v. Cannon Mills) in which the driver fol-
lowing was suing the driver turning, seems to impose a more stringent
duty on the turning driver than Stovall v. Ragaknd,'4 in which the
driver turning was suing the driver following. In the Ervin case a signal
was admittedly given, although the court was somewhat doubtful
whether it complied with the 50 feet requirement of N. C. GEN. STAT.
§20-154, and the court emphasized that in addition the turning triver
had not ascertained whether the turn could be made in safety by looking
in his rear view mirror. But even assuming proper giving of a signal
the court declares that compliance with the minimum requirements of the
statute is not necessarily an exercise of the ordinary care of the reason-
able prudent man under the circumstances-which is the ultimate
criterion. In the Stovall -decision the court seemed eager to hold that
the turning driver's conduct could be found to have complied with the
statute without making any inquiry into a more extensive duty. How-
ever, since the court did not hold the turning driver free of negligence
as a matter of law, there is no conflict in the cases. The court seems to
feel that such a flexible formula is a necessary concomitant to variable
facts.
The application of these rules to an accident caused by the sudden
stopping of a preceding vehicle which is hit in the rear by the vehicle
following raises similar principles.' 5 The mere stopping on a highway
without a signal is not negligence. Even though a stop signal is not
given, the jury may still be allowed to decide whether the conduct was
negligent. 6 Holland v. Strader14 presented the familiar autumn scene
of a long string of closely following automobiles proceeding to a foot-
ball game at Chapel Hill, intermittently slowing and increasing speed.
The defendant was forced to stop because of the stopping of the auto-
mobiles ahead of him, and he did so suddenly and without a signal.
On this showing, plaintiff, who smashed into the rear of defendant's car,
was allowed to go to the jury.
The usual view of the North Carolina court is that the jury should
decide these uncertain questions of negligence and contributory negli-
" E. g., emphasis in Ervin decision on compliance plus.
"Wall v. Bain, 222 N. C. 375, 379, 23 S. E. 2d 330, 333 (1942).
214211 N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937).
" Conley v. Pearce Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. 2d 740 (1944).
" See cases cited note 18 infra.2216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939).
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gence regardless of which driver, following or preceding, is the plaintiff.
Thus a finding of no original negligence of defendent or of contributory
negligence as a matter of law in these turning or stopping accidents is
ordinarily not proper. 8
A limited number of decisions, however, have granted nonsuit1 0 or
sustained a demurrer in cases involving both turning20 and stopping.21
in all of these the ruling was in favor of the turning or stopping driver.
In reaching such a decision, reliance is placed upon one or more of
three factors.
(1) The following driver was guilty of conduct which was a breach
of some of the duties imposed upon him; viz. in following too closely,
failing to sound horn before passing, exceeding proper speed.2 2
(2) The turning or stopping driver may assume that the following
driver will obey these traffic rules and will exercise due care for the
safety of others. 23 This right is qualified,24 however, and the court
has stated that a driver may so rely only when he himself is free of
negligence.
(3) The court may invoke the "outrunning the headlights" doc-
"Turning: Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950); Levy v. Carolina Alu-
minum Co., 232 N. C. 158, 59 S. E. 2d 632 (1950) ; Beaman v. Duncan, 228 N. C.
600, 46 S. E. 2d 707 (1948); Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C.
390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942) (bicycle treated for these purposes as vehicle; here
bicycle was turning); Mason v. Johnston, 215 N. C. 95, 1 S. E. 2d 379 (1939)(court said in passing that nonsuit properly refused); Stovall v. Ragland, 211
N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937); Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co., 208
N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935).
Stopping: Banks v. Shepard, 230 N. C. 86, 52 S. E. 2d 215 (1949); Barlow
v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1948); Conley v. Pearce
Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. 2d 740 (1944) ; Bechtler v. Bracken,
218 N. C. 515, 11 S. E. 2d 721 (1940) (new trial given plaintiff against whom
verdict rendered) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939);
Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938).
" The usual rules as to granting of nonsuit on ground of contributory negli-
gence are: (1) nonsuit will not be sustained or directed unless the evidence is
so clear that no other conclusion seems permissible; (2) the evidence'is taken
in the light most favorable to plaintiff and he is entitled to every reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom; accordingly only that part of defendant's evi-
dence which is favorable to plaintiff will be considered. Atkins v. White Trans-
portation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944), and cases cited there.
But see possible modification of rule (2) in the majority opinion and concurring
opinion of Stacy, C. J., in this case (evidence considered to explain and make
clear plaintiff's evidence, to make manifest natural or physical circumstances which
may bar recovery. Pp. 692-3). The three-member dissent takes issue with the
majority on the evidence to be considered.
. Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) (nonsuit) ; Austin
v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (nonsuit) ; Cooley v. Baker,
231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950) (demurrer to complaint sustained; acci-
dent between meeting cars).
"Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d 419 (1949) ; Warner v. Lazarus
229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 2d 496 (1948); Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224
N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944).
22 Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950).
23 Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950).
24 See Sebastian v. Horton Motor Lines, 213 N. C. 770 (1938).
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trine-which raises a duty to drive at a speed at which the driver can
stop within the range of his headlights, the violation of which is negli-
gence as a matter of law. 25 This rule has been applied by a line of
North Carolina cases to support the nonsuiting of a plaintiff who hits
the rear of a vehicle parked on the highway.2 6 An inquiry whether it
should also be applied to moving vehicles which suddenly stop or turn
without warning is somewhat academic in the face of statements by
the court that this line of cases is also controlling as to stopping27
and turning.28 The doctrine has undergone a turbulent history,29 and
its present status is made somewhat doubtful by the most recent deci-
sion 0 which sent a similar hitting-the-rear-of-a-parked-vehicle situation'
to the jury.
The court has also emphasized that in order to establish contributory
negligence (here as a matter of law) it is not necessary to show that
the plaintiff's negligence was the sole and proximate or "real and effi-
cient" cause, but merely that there was negligence of plaintiff which
concurred with that of defendant to contribute to the injury.3 1 This is
to be contrasted with the rule that in order to insulate negligence of a
defendant, the negligence of the other tortfeasor must be the motivating
or principal negligence which proximately causes the accident and
hence overshadows the defendant's negligence 32 Therefore a showing
of negligence of less serious nature is adequate to support a nonsuit
predicated on contributory negligence.
The cases discussed thus far have involved collision of vehicles pro-
ceeding in the same direction but these principles are likewise applicable
to the turning by one vehicle across the path of another vehicle approach-
ing from the opposite direction.33
In several cases the sudden turn is made to avoid some obstruction
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rev. 153 (1948).
E.g., Marshall v. Southern Ry., 233 N. C. 38 (1951) ; Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C.
155, 52 S. E. 2d 355 (1949); Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251
(1948) ; Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105 S. E. 2d 608 (1940) ; Weston v. Southern
Ry., 194 N. C. 210, 139 S. E. 237 (1927).
"Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d 419 (1949) ; Atkins v. White
Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944).
" Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) ; Austin v. Overton,
222 N. C_. 89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (plaintiff and defendant disagree whether
driver stopped or turned).
"' A line of cases contra to those cited in note 28 supra has developed. E.g.,
Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377 (1949) ; Cum-
mins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945); Leonard v.
Tatum Transfer Co., 218 N. C. 667, 12 S. E. 2d 729 (1940).
"Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377 (1951).
"Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942).
" Beaman v. Duncan, 228 N. C. 600, 46 S. E. 2d 707 (1948) ; Powers v. Stern-
berg & Co., 213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938).
" Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950), Butner v. Spease,
217 N. C. 82, 6 S. E. 2d 808 (1940) ;
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in the road ahead.3 4 These were cases in which the court refused to
rule against the party turning, as a matter of law.3 5 The court, then,
may take notice that an emergency was created30 and hence hold the
driver only to the standard of care commensurate with the emergency
circumstances.37 Indeed one faced with the choice between instantly
turning or striking the object ahead should perhaps not be charged with
the ordinary presence of mind requiring the giving of a signal. How-
ever, it has been declared that the principle is not available to one who
by his own negligence has brought about or contributed to the
emergency.3 8
Just as the court favors submitting issues of negligence of defendant
to the jury, it may also be held error to fail to submit the issue of con-
tributory negligence of plaintiff to the jury.3 9
Even though a plaintiff who turns without a signal is shown to be
guilty of contributory negligence yet he may win on an issue of last
clear chance.40
To what extent are modern mechanical and electrical devices on the
rear and front of vehicles, indicating turning and stopping, a compliance
with the driver's duty? N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-154 authorizes not only
a hand signal but also signal by mechanical or electrical devices "ap-
proved by the department" (of Motor Vehicles).
Administratively, the practice of the Department of Motor Vehicles
is to approve in blanket form certain devices which have been tested
by the department according to the candle power and size of the light,
frequency of flashing, etc. It is the opinion of the Department of
Motor Vehicles and the Department of Justice that an operator of any
automobile equipped with one of the approved types of devices in good
working order may use it in lieu of the hand signal-at least in regard
to turning. Some doubt has been expressed as to the adequacy of the
rear brake light as a substitute for a hand stop signal since (1) the
light flashes when the brakes are applied which may mean mere slowing
rather than stopping and (2) there is no intermittent flashing and
hence it is less noticeable than a turn indicator.
"4 Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942)
(opening door of car at side of road); Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co.,
208 N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935) (chicken); Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C.
89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (turning driver claims drunk man in the road).
"
2 But cf. Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939) (stopping
caused by stopping ahead in football traffic).
"4 Tarrant v. Pepsi Cola Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942).
27 Sparks v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 28, 44 S. E. 2d 343, 344 (1947).
: Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N. C. 412, 42 S. E. 2d 593 (1947).
SMason v. Johnston, 215 N. C. 95, 1 S. E. 2d 379 (1939).
"' Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co., 208 N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935).
But cf. Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N. C. 283, 10 S. E. 2d 727
(1940).
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Although there has been no square holding that these devices are
adequate compliance with the driver's statutory duty, yet decisions have
given cognizance to their ability to warn the driver following and put
him on notice.4 1 Hence even though no hand signal is given, it is clear
that the flashing of a directional turn signal on the rear and front of
the vehicle, or the flashing of a red light on the rear when the brakes
are applied, are circumstances which will be considered. In a recent
case42 in which the operator of a stopping bus relied on the rear brake
lights, the court held that a mere showing that the inspector for the
Utilities Commission had approved the bus and that the bus had the
lighting equipment prescribed by the Commission was not sufficient
evidence of compliance with the above statute.
HUBERT B. HumPHREY, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decrees
A recent North Carolina case1 is typical of the cases which pose
the problems inherent in the methods of enforcing foreign alimony de-
crees. Plaintiff wife brought action to establish and enforce a Florida
decree directing payment of $100 monthly alimony. The trial court
entered judgment for plaintiff for past due and unpaid installments
accrued, decreed the adoption of the Florida judgment, and thereupon
entered an order directing payment of future installments as they become
due. Held: plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment ordering payment
of future installments, but only to a money judgment for past due and
unpaid installments due her under the decree, "which judgment" the
court added "is enforceable by execution and not by contempt proceed-
ings. -
The courts are generally in agreement- that a foreign alimony decree
is not enforceable in so far as it relates to future installments.a And as
"'Levy v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 232 N. C. 158, 59 S. E. 2d 632 (1950)
(turning signal) ; Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) (turning
signal); Barlow v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1949)
(brake lights); Warner v. Lazarus, 229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 496 (1948) (brake
lights; court even raised question of how many feet brake lights were on before
collision); Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938) (brake
lights; court let jury decide whether adequate compliance with statute; the then
statute apparently did not contain a provision for electrical signal). But see Grimm
v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950), where facts indicated electrical turn signal
given, but no mention made of it in court's opinion.
"Banks v. Shepard, 230 N. C. 86, 52 S. E. 2d 215 (1949).
'Willard v. Rodman, 233 N. C. 198, 63 S. E. 2d 106 (1951).
"Id. at p. 202.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not obligate the courts of one state to
enforce an alimony decree rendered in another state with regard to future pay-
ments, particularly when such future installments are subject to modification by
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a result of the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause4 of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the authorities are unanimous in enforcing foreign
decrees for alimony to the extent of accrued installments not subject to
modification.5 However, since the full faith and credit mandate does not
extend to remedies, unanimity is not compelled as to the method of en-
forcement. 6 The ordinary method of enforcing a foreign judgment is by
an action at law and recovery of a money judgment followed by execu-
tion thereon.7 Since a foreign alimony decree is one ordering the payment
of money, all courts accord the ordinary method of enforcement to local
money judgments based upon foreign 'decrees. The point of departure is
on the question whether the local judgment is also enforceable by equi-
table processes such as sequestration, receivership, injunction, writ of
ne e.eat, and contempt proceedings. 8 Analysis of the case law on
this point reveals a marked schism in the courts; one side totally deny-
ing equitable relief, the other granting the full scope of equitable en-
forcement.
Among those jurisdictions in which equitable relief is denied, three
views are taken. (1) Alimony due under a foreign decree is merely a
diebt, collectible by execution upon a judgment recovered locally upon
the foreign decree. From this premise it is concluded that, the remedy at
law being complete and adequate, equity has no jurisdiction to exercise
its extraordinary powers of enforcement. 9 (2) The equitable remedies
the court rendering the decree. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1909) ; Lynde
v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901); Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U. S. 1859);
Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929) ; German v. Ger-
man, 122 Conn. 155, 188 Atl. 429 (1936) ; Kossower v. Kossower, 142 Atl. 30 (N.
J. 1928). However, on the basis of comity some courts allow establishment of the
foreign decree and give enforcement thereto the same as to a local decree. See
e.g., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 117, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941); Fanchier v.
Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore.
184, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936) ; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935).
'U. S. CONST. Art. IV, §1.
'Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1
(1909); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901); Webb v. Webb, 222 N. C.
551, 23 S. E. 2d 897 (1943) ; Lockman v. Lockman, 220 N. C. 95, 16 S. E. 2d
670 (1941) (J. Devin stated, "Whatever uncertainty may have existed as to the
law on this subject seems to have been settled by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Sistare v. Sistare.").
' In German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 AtI. 429 (1936), the court stated,
"The constitutional provisional, however, only requires that the courts of a state
other than that in which the decree is rendered shall give effect to it by the
ordinary remedies appropriate to an action upon a judgment." 2 BEALE, CONFLICT
oF LAWS 1377: "The method of enforcement of a foreign judgment is governed by
the law of the forum."
' It may- be pointed out in this connection that judgments and decrees of one
state have, under the Full Faith and Credit provision, no operative force of their
own in another state. To have the force of a judgment in another state, it must
be made a judgment there. See 2 BEALE CONFLICr oF LAws 1378.
' See Notes, 97 A.L.R. 1197 (1935), 109 A.L.R. 652 (1937).
o Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901); Worsley v. Worsley, 76 F. 2d 815
(D. C. Cir. 1935) cert. denied, 294 U. S. 725 (1935); Ives v. Ives, 247 Ala. 690,
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prescribed by local statutes for the enforcement of decrees of alimony
have reference only to decrees of local courts and do not apply to de-
crees of courts of sister states." (3) Equitable enforcement is not re-
quired by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution,
because that provision does not extend to the method of or remedy for
enforcement of foreign judgments.1 1
Those courts which grant equitable enforcement, deny the validity
of the premise that a judgment for alimony due under a foreign decree
is merely a debt. Such a judgment is said to represent more than an
ordinary 'debt,12 in that its origin lies in the marital duty of the husband
to support his wife and is a continuation of that duty; this duty rests
upon public policy, and is thus a matter of public concern, regardless
of where the obligation arises or where its enforcement is sought. One
well reasoned decision expresses the view in this manner:
"Migration of the parties across a state line has wrought no change in
the nature and basis of the obligation. Its purpose remains the payment
of alimony needed for the support of a former wife and the child of
herself and the -debtor. To the ordinary mind, untroubled by legal
nuances, the money due from defendant remains alimony, wherever
they or either may be. We prefer that nontechnical view which regards
the substance of the matter as unchanged by the mere removal of the
debtor across a state line."'13
The assumption that the remedy at law is complete and adequate has
also been assailed. It is said that the lapse of time that occurs between
filing of suit, entry of judgment, and execution sale, works an increas-
ing hardship upon dependents entitled to the necessaries of life; that the
difficulty of finding assets of a recalcitrant defendant upon which to levy
execution often makes the legal remedy wholly ineffective. 14 Unlike
the courts which restrict the operation of local statutes providing
26 So. 2d 93 (1946) ; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204, 26 S. E. 2d 283 (1943) ;
Kossower v. Kossower, 142 Ati. 30 (N. J. 1928); Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq.
306, 49 AtI. 501 (Ct. of Err. and App. 1901).
10 This view stems from -the premise that a judgment on a foreign decree is not
one for alimony, but a judgment to authorize enforcement of the foreign decree
in the forum, that therefore, the local statutory remedies for the enforcement of
a local decree for alimony are not applicable thereto. See Page v. Page, 189 Mass.
85, 75 N. E. 92 (1905) ; Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890 (1908) ;
see also, Kelley v. Kelley, 275 App. Div. 887, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (4th Dep't 1949)(New York statute provides for application of statutory equitable remedies if
foreign divorce granted on grounds of adultery, N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr, §§1171,
1172).
"Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1909) ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901).
1 For a discussion of some of the peculiar attributes of alimony see Munson,
Some Aspects of the Nature of Permanent Alimony, 16 CoL. L. L 217 (1916).
12 Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449, 450 (1934).
,See Brief, prepared by Nat'l Ass'n of Legal Aid Organizations, 34 MAss. L.Q. 9 (Oct. 1949).
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for equitable enforcement of local decrees of divorce and alimony, the
courts granting equitable relief assert, more realistically, that the charac-
ter of the obligation imposed by the foreign decree is not changed by
mere crossing of state lines, and unhesitatingly apply the local statute
on the ground of public policy.' 5 The main basis mentioned for afford-
ing equitable remedies is the principle of comity. The courts adopting
this view justify their decisions by stating,
"... we decline debate as to how little we can do for plaintiff and yet
comply with the full faith and credit mandate. In view of her plain right,
and the need for its enforcement, not only in justice to her and her
child, but also to vindicate our system of interstate comity, we prefer
only to inquire whether our district court has adequate power to give
plaintiff the remedy which the nature of her claim commends as just."'"
It is apparent from the nature of the problem and the purpose of
alimony decrees that the question is not whether, by reason of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, it is obligatory upon the state courts to accord
equitable enforcement to the alimony decrees of sister states, but
whether, by reason of comity, public policy, or need for enforcement,
the state courts ought to accord equitable enforcement to such decrees.
That this question is to be answered affirmatively is indicated by the
trend of recent cases.' 7
The increased mobility of people in this country (the national popu-
lation) accentuates the need for effective enforcement to deter a delin-
quent defendant from resorting to flight across state lines to escape his
legally imposed duty. This need is reflected in a new approach to the
national problem, i.e., specific legislation designed to obviate the obstacles
heretofore in the path of effective enforcement. The Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act,' 8 promulgated by the National Confer-
" Creager v. Superior Ct., 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. 2d 552 (1932) ; Ostrander
v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449 (1934); Shibley v. Shibley, 181
Wash. 166, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935).
"8 Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449, 450 (1934) ; see also,
Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 287, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936) ; McKeel v. McKeel,
185 Va. 108, 37 S. E. 2d 746 (1946).
17 Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 117, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941); German v.
German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 Atl. 429 (1936); McDuffie v. McDufie, 155 Fla.
63, 19 So. 2d 511 (1944) (first impression) ; Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.
E. 2d 379 (1942) (first impression); Gianton v. Renner, 285 Ky. 808, 149 S. W.
2d 748 (1941) (first impression); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252
N. W. 449 (1934); Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927)
(first impression); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 287, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936)(first impression); Johnson v. Johnson, 194 S. C. 115, 8 S. E. 2d 351 (1940)(first impression); Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S. D. 134, 272 N. W. 179 (1937)(first impression) ; Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S. W. 2d 597 (1947)(first impression); McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S. E. 2d 746 (1946)
(first impression); Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935)(first impression).
"8 Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
175 (1950).
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ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in September, 1950,
attempts to remedy the failure of existing legal techniques and the
inadequacy of concepts of personal jurisdiction and full faith and credit
to resolve the problem of deserted dependents in a federal system. A
simple two-state procedure is devised whereby the courts of each state
participate in enforcing, by appropriate civil and criminal remedies, the
duty of support owed by a person who has fled from one state to the
other, provided, of course, that both states have the same or substan-
tially similar reciprocal law.19
Subsequent to the principal case, this Act, with modifications, was
enacted into law by the North Carolina General Assembly.20 The adop-
tion of this Act is an unequivocal legislative expression of the public
policy of this state to provide effective means of coping with the prob-
lems inherent in the interstate enforcement of support. Since reciprocity
is the heart of the act, its efficacy may be gauged by the number of states
that adopt it. Until its full potential is realized by widespread adoption,
the court should feel bound to give effect to the legislative declaration of
public policy by providing equitable, as well as legal, remedies for en-
forcing foreign alimony decrees and support orders, in those cases that
come before it from states which have yet to adopt a reciprocal or
similar law.
JOHN T. Mo~msEy.
Constitutional Law-Privilege Against Self-IncTimination-
Smith Act
In the recent case of Blau v. United States,' petitioner, in response
to a subpoena, appeared as a witness before the United States District
Court Grand Jury at Denver, Colorado. There she was asked several
questions 2 concerning the Communist Party of Colorado and her em-
"9 For a substantially similar act, progenitor of the principal act, see UNIFORM
SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS Acr, adopted by 10 jurisdictions in 1949. CONN. GEN.
STAT. tit. 63, c. 415a (Supp. 1949) ; ILL. Rv. STAT. c. 68, Sec. 50 (1949) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. sec. 38-118a (Bums 1949); IOWA CODE c. 252A (1950); M& LAws
c. 297 (1949) ; N. H. LAWS c. 153 (1949) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, c. 18, sec.
17.1 (Gum. Supp. 1950); McK. UNcONSOL. LAWS sec. 2111-2120 (1949); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, sec. 1601-1610 (Supp. 1949); VIRGIN ISLANDS, Bill No. 3 (1949).
Though bearing the title, "Uniform," this act was not promulgated by the Na-
tional Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. For an interesting account of the
genesis of this Act, see Griswold, "Fugitive Husbands," American Magazine,
Jan. 1949, p. 24.
2. See summary of new statute, supra p. 423.
171 Sup. Ct. 223 (1950).
-"Do you know the names of the State officers of the Communist Party of
Colorado?" "Do you know what the organization of the Communist Party of
Colorado is, the table of organization of the Communist Party of Colorado?"
"Were you ever employed by the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Did you ever
have in your possession or custody any of the books and records of the Communist
19511
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ployment by it, all of which she refused to answer, asserting her con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination.3 The petitioner was
adjudged guilty of contempt. 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed,r0 stating
that membership in the Party is not of itself an offense, therefore
answers to the questions propounded would not subject petitioner to
criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court, by unanimous decision,0
reversed stating that the Smith Act 7 made further prosecution of peti-
tioner far more than a mere imaginary possibility, and that she could
reasonably fear prosecution under it if she admitted employment by the
Communist Party or intimate knowledge of its working. Whether such
admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a criminal
statute was immaterial since they would have furnished a link in the
chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of petitioner for violation of
or conspiracy to violate,8 the Smith Act.
This decision resolves the conflict among lower federal courts as to
whether a witness may refuse to answer inquiries as to his affiliation
with or knowledge of the Communist Party on the ground of self-in-
crimination.9 The Supreme Court, in the principal case, states that
"the attempt by the lower courts to compel petitioner to testify runs
counter to the Fifth Amendment as it has been interpreted' o from the
Party of Colorado?" "Did you turn the books and records of the Communist
Party of Colorado over to any particular person?" "Do you know the names of
any persons who might now have the books and records of the Communist Party
of Colorado?" "Could you describe to the grand jury any books and records of the
Communist Party of Colorado ?"3 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. "No person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ."
'Petitioner asserted privilege before the grand jury and refused to answer,
whereupon she was taken before the District Judge who again propounded the
same questions, and petitioner again claimed privilege and refused to testify.
180 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1950).
' Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
" 18 U. S. C. §2385 (1948). "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets,
advises, or teaches the duty, necessity ... of overthrowing ... the government of
the United States .. . ; or . . . whoever organizes or helps . . . to organize any
society . . . of persons who teach ... the overthrow . . of any such government
by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group . . . of persons, knowing the purposes thereof shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ......
s 18 U.S.C. §371 (1948). "If two or more persons conspire to commit any
offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
*.. or both."
9 Privilege overruled: Blau v. U. S., 180 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1950); Rogers
v. U. S., 179 F. 2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950).
Privilege allowed: Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Estes v.
Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Kasinowitz v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 632 (9th
Cir. 1950); Doran v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
"o For an excellent historical discussion see Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incdinination, 34 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
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beginning."' 1 The privilege insures that a person, whether defendant or
witness,12 shall not be compelled to give testimony which discloses a
fact that would form a necessary and essential part of a crime, or which
forms a link in the chain of testimony which would be sufficient to con-
vict him of any crime. 13 For a witness to be entitled to the privilege,
the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of
the evidence which the witness is called to give,' 4 that there is reasonable
ground for the witness to apprehend danger of criminal prosecution-
mere imaginary possibility of danger is not sufficient to justify use of the
privilege.' 5 Also, it must not be put forward for a sentimental reason,
or where witness has already received pardon for the crime, concerning
which he is interrogated, or where prosecution therefor is barred by
the statute of limitations.' 6 The privilege is essentially a personal one,
applying only to natural individuals'7 and it may not be invoked for the
protection of third persons,' 8 or by individuals standing in a representa-
tive capacity even though the testimony required may incriminate the
witness personally.19 It may be invoked in court proceedings as well as
before a federal grand jury20 or administrative agency,21 and it must be
1171 Sup. Ct. 223, at 224 (1950).
1- Raffel v. U. S., 271 U. S. 494 (1926) ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34
(1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1891).
3Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th
Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Kasinowitz v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Doran v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950) ;
Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v. Rosen, 174 F. 2d
187 (2id Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Wiseman, 111 F. 2d 260 (2nd Cir. 1940); U. S. v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14, 692e (C. C. D. Va.).
Witness is protected from being compelled to disclose the circumstances of his
offense, or the sources from which, or the means by which, evidence of its com-
mission, or of his connection with it, may be obtained, or made effectual for his
conviction. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1891).
" U. S. v. Hoffman, 185 F. 2d 617 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d
865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v.
Rosen, 174 F. 2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1949) ; U. S. v. Wiseman, 111 F. 2d 260 (2nd Cir.
1940).
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362
(1916) ; Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950) ; U. S. v. Hoffman, 185
F. 2d 617 (3rd Cir. 1950).
"0 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
" U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Brown v. U. S., 276 U. S. 134
(1928) ; Essgee Co. of China v. U. S., 262 U. S. 151 (1923) ; Grant v. U. S., 227
U. S. 74 (1913) ; Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S. 478 (1913) ; Wilson v. U. S., 211
U. S. 361 (1911).
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141
(1931); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.
43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
"Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906); Healey v. U. S., 186 F. Zd 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
7" U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.
547 (1891); U. S. v. Hoffman, 185 F. 2d 617 (3rd Cir. 1950).
-Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1950); U. S. v. DeLorenzo, 151 F. 2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1945).
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invoked specifically,22 else it is waived23 and thereupon the witness must
make full disclosure.24 Also, it may not be asserted where the prose-
cution feared will be by another sovereign. 25 Immunity statutes may
abate the privilege, but to be valid, they must be as broad as the con-
stitutional privilege itself.20
The decision of the principal case affords persons interrogated con-
cerning their knowledge of, or connection with, the Communist Party,
its activities or members, a definite constitutional ground for refusal to
answer. In the past, such persons refused to answer on the grounds that
the questions asked violated the guarantees of the First Amendment;
or, where the investigation was being conducted by a congressional com-
mittee, the witness refused to answer, stating the committee was uncon-
stitutional since Congress has no power to make investigations into
private affairs 27 or legislate in re freedom of speech. But these defenses
were rejected in several cases, including those of the Hollywood Ten.28
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424
(1943) ; McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; U. S. v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp.
538 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVmENCE §2268 (3d ed. 1940).
' Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951) ; U. S. v. Gates, 176 F. 2d 78 (2nd
Cir. 1949) ; U. S. v. DeLorenzo, 151 F. 2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1945) ; U. S. v. John-
son, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947). But cf. Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137
(1949) ; U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
2 Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); Raffel v. U. S., 271 U. S. 494
(1926) ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U. S. 355 (1922) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.
S. 591 (1896) ; U. S. v. Gates, 176 F. 2d 78 (2nd Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Johnson,
76 F. Supp. 538 (M. D. Pa. 1947.).
2 U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906).
" Smith v. U. S., 337 U. S. 137 (1949) ; U. S. v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U. S. 547 (1891). Oral offer of immunity by interrogator insufficient, Healey v.
U. S., 186 F. 2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950).2 7 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880). Notes, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 775
(1949) ; 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 464 (1949) ; 23 NOTRE DAMz LAW. 353 (1948).
2 Marshall v. U. S., 176 F.2d 473 (D. C. Cir. 1949); Lawson v. U. S.,
176 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1949); U. S. v. Dennis, 171 F. 2d 986 (D. C.
Cir. 1948); Eisler v. U. S., 170 F. 2d 273 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Barsky
v. U. S., 167 F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948);
U. S. v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 838
(1948), rehearing denied, 333 U. S. 858 (1948). Notes, 6 WAsu. & LEE L. REv.
66 (1949), 47 COL. L. REV. 416 (1947). But cf. 43 ILL L. Rv. 253 (1948). Statute
suggested by writer in 27 NED. L. R.Ev. 601 (1948).
Defenses in question were raised by above defendants being prosecuted for
violation of REv. STAT. §102 (1857), 2 U. S. C. §192 (1938), making it a mis-
demeanor to refuse to answer any question of a Congressional Committee perti-
nent to the inquiry. Violations are: refusal to produce subpoenaed records, U. S.
v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950). U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944) ; refusal to
appear, McGrainv. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1936), U. S. v. Dennis, siupra; re-
fusal to answer, Lawson v. U. S., supra; refusal to be sworn, Eisler v.
U. S., supra, U. S. v. Josephson, supra. This statute applies to witnesses
who voluntarily appear as well as those summoned; also, in prosecution under
it, burden on government to show question was pertinent to matter under in-
vestigation, and issue of "pertinency" is for the court, and not the jury, Sinclair
v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1928). Questions in re finances and personnel of the
Communist organization are pertinent, Marshall v. U. S., 176 F. 2d 473 (D. C.
Cir. 1949).
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What will be the effect of this holding upon investigations of the
Communist Party? The present case makes it clear that a witness may
refuse to answer questions concerning his knowledge of or connection
with the Party because of their incriminating effect. The next problem
is, before what investigating panels may a witness invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination? He may do so before any federal grand jury
or federal judge as was done in the principal case.29 May the privilege
be invoked before a congressional committee? In a recent oral decision,
Federal Judge T. Alan Goldsborough held that a witness before a Senate
investigating committee was within his constitutional rights in refusing
to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination, 30 and acquitted
the witness of contempt-of-Congress charges. The Judge stated, "The
court is of the opinion that if the defendant had answered all thirty-two
questions8 ' in the affirmative-or in a certain way-it would have taken
very little more evidence to put him in the penitentiary." There is no
Supreme Court holding squarely on the point,3 2 but that court has held
that Congress may investigate subject only to the restraints imposed by
the Constitution.3 3 Lower federal courts have also so indicated,34 as
well as writers on the problem.3 5 It is well to note that the Supreme
Court has held3 6 that the immunity granted by statute37 to witnesses
before congressional committees is insufficient to abate the constitutional
privilege, since the purpose of the immunity statute was effectively nulli-
fied in 1891 by Counselman v. Hitchcock.38
The result of the present ruling forces the investigating authorities
20 Cases cited note 20 supra.
N. Y. Times, March 22, 1951, p. 37, col. 4.
"' Defendant was asked questions concerning his connection with the defunct
subversive magazine "Amerasia"; his knowledge and association with other per-
sons guilty of subversive activities.
"2 Whether or not the privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed by a
witness before a Congressional Committee.
" U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) ; Barry v. U. S. ex rel. Cunningham,
279 U. S. 597 (1928).
"4 Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950) states that congressional
committees have the right to subpoena witnesses and ask questions, and it is the
duty of such witnesses to answer, but by n. 18 the Court recognizes that the wit-
ness in the present case made no claim of privilege against self-incrimination.25 Notes, 49 CoL L. REv. 87 (1949), 35 VA. L. RFv. 97 (1949).0U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950).
7 18 U. S. C. §3486 (1948). "No testimony given by a witness before ...
any committee of either House ... shall be used as evidence in any criminal
prosecution against him in any court. .. ."
28 142 U. S. 547 (1891), which held REv. STAT. §860 [statute identical in all
material respects to REv. STAT. §859, 18 U. S. C. §3486 (1948)] was not sufficient
substitute for the Constitutional privilege. Thereafter REv. STAT. §860 was repealed
by Congress. "But," the Court in U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) con-
tinues, "attention of Congress has not apparently been called to the anomaly
presented by the continued existence of REv. STAT. §859, which, like Rav. STAT.
§860, was a constituent part of immunity 'bargain' declared invalid in the Coun-
selman case."
See 49 COL. L. Rav. 87 (1949).
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to search for independent evidence instead of relying upon proof ex-
tracted from individuals by force of law.8 9 This renders investigation
of the Communist Party exceedingly difficult, since it is so tightly
woven. It is 'doubted that the Internal Security Act of 195040 is of
sufficient protection to abate the assertion of the privilege since prose-
cution under the Smith Act 4 ' is the real danger and not membership in
the Communist Party.4 2 There is but one remaining hope for the in-
terrogators: that the witness will waive the privilege and, as a result, be
required to make a full disclosure of his knowledge of the Party. Such a
waiver is consummated when the witness answers any questions in re-
gards to his knowledge of or affiliation with or membership in the Com-
munist Party.43 Therefore, to avoid the dangers of a waiver and pre-
serve his privilege the witness must refuse to answer all questions con-
cerning his association with the Party, as Patricia Blau did in the
principal case, or be held to have waived the privilege if any of such
questions are answered, as was done by Jane Rogers in the same
investigation. 44
WILLIAm E. GREEN.,
"Such independent evidence may not be obtained from the spouse of the wit-
ness interrogated, Blau v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 301 (1951). Petitioner in this
case is husband of petitioner in the principal case.
'064 STAT. 991, 50 U. S. C. A. §783f (Supp. 1950). "Neither the holding of
office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall con-
stitute per se a violation . . . of any . . . criminal statute." The Supreme Court,
in Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951), expressed no opinion as to the im-
plications of this legislation upon issues presented in that case, and discussed in
this note.
"'See note 7 up ra.
" Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951); Healey v. U. S., 186 F. 2d 164
(9th Cir. 1950) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Doran v. U. S.,
181 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir.
1950).
"Rogers v. U. S., 71 Sup. Ct. 438 (1951). In this case, the petitioner, Jane
Rogers admitted she was treasurer of the Communist Party of Colorado;
also that she had possession of the books and records thereof up until January
1948, the investigation being held in September 1948, but she refused to answer
questions as to whom she had turned them over to, on the ground of self-in-
crimination. The Supreme Court held that she had waived the privilege, and
that the answer to the propounded question would subject her to no further danger
of prosecution than she was already subjected to because of previous admissions.
The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Black, states that the majority opinion
too greatly expands the "waiver" doctrine and therefore the witness runs the risk
of refusing to answer prematurely and be in contempt, or answering and thereby
waiving the privilege against self-incrimination. Quaere: Could there be a pre-
mature refusal to answer under the decision of the principal case?
" Both Patricia Blau and Jane Rogers were subpoenaed and interrogated by
the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
in September 1948. Both refused to answer and were found guilty of contempt
of court, and both appealed to the Supreme Court. Patricia Blau's case was
decided first, in December 1950.
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Easements-Creation by Covenant in Deed
Plaintiff sought to have a municipal garbage dump abated as a
private and public nuisance and to recover special damages for its
maintenance.1 The municipality defended the action on the basis of a
recorded deed in which the predecessors in title to the plaintiff granted
the defendant the right to use the land as a garbage dump and released
all rights of action arising out of the use of the land for that purpose.
This release was expressly made binding upon the grantors' successors
in title. The North Carolina Supreme Court held on appeal that even if
it be conceded that the normal operation of the garbage dump consti-
tuted a nuisance, the plaintiff was estopped to assert any claim by rea-
son of the covenants in the deed to defendant. The release created a
"right in the nature of an easement" in the remaining lands of the
grantor, binding on his successors in interest.2
While easements3 are generally created by grant or prescription, a
covenant may be given the effect of granting an easement when neces-
sary to carry out the manifest intention of the parties.4 Such covenants
are valid and enforceable without regard to whether they may interfere
with alienation. 5 A covenant will be construed as creating an easement
only under certain conditions. There must be both a dominant and a
servient tenement. 6 The easement created must be appurtenant to the
dominant tenement to which it belongs and must relate to the servient
tenement upon which its burden is imposed. 7 The dominant tenement
must be described with particularity s and must receive substantial bene-
fit from the easement created.9 It is not necessary that the dominant and
'Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).2 Although the court speaks of this as being a right in the nature of an ease-
ment, it is giving the covenant the effect of a duly recorded easement.
' The word "easement," as here used includes both negative and affirmative
easements. "A negative easement is one the effect of which is not to authorize
the doing of an act by the person entitled to the easement, but merely to preclude
the owner of the land subject to the easement from doing that which, if no ease-
ment existed, he would be entitled to do. An affirmative easement is one which
authorizes the doing of acts which, if no easement existed, would give rise to
a right of action." Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289,
66 P. 2d 792 (1937).
'Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E. 794 (1930) ; Hogan v. Berry,
143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253 (1887); Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175 (1871);
Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1 (1870); 1 THo PsoN, REAL PROPERTY §372(Perm. ed. 1939) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §776 (3d ed. 1939).
'2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY §259 (1947).
' Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 16R N. E. 794 (1930). "A dominant
estate is the one enjoying the easement, and to which it is attached; the servient
estate is the one upon which the easement is imposed." Walker v. Clifford, 128
Ala. 67, 29 So. 588 (1901).
'Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).8 Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal. App. 2d 465, 173 P. 2d 573 (1946).
Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).
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servient tenements be contiguous,' 0 and whether an easement is appurte-
nant or in gross1 ' is determined by the intent of the parties. 12 Since
such a covenant concerns an interest in realty, and hence comes within
the Statute of Frauds, the courts have generally required that it be in
writing, and a mere oral license is revocable.13
A great variety of covenants have been held to create valid and en-
forceable easements. When the grantor covenanted for himself and his
heirs, assigns and personal representatives that he would forever main-
tain a fence between the property conveyed and his remaining lands,
the court held that this covenant imposed an easement in the adjacent
land of the grantor in favor of the grantee which could only be conveyed
with a grant of the dominant tenement to which it was attached.14
Such a covenant runs with the land, and is not merely personal between
the parties. Covenants for light and air between adjoining property
owners and between parties to a deed may create easements' 5 which
pass to subsequent grantees of the property to which the easement
appertains.' 6 A covenant in restraint of trade does not create an ease-
ment since it is invalid as being against public policy.' 7 A covenant
that the land would revert to the grantor if the premises should ever
be used for the sale of liquors has been held to create an easement
appurtenant to the remaining lands of the grantor,' 8 and agreements
between persons who each own a separate half of a building that no
20 D. M. Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 42, 89 N. E.
272 (1909).
" "Easements appendant and appurtenant are always owned in connection with
other real estate and as incidents to such ownership, while easements in gross are
purely personal and usually end with the death of the grantee." Davis v. Robin-
son, 189 N. C. 589, 598, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
A right of way across another's property to gain egress and ingress to the
realty owned would be an appurtenant easement. An easement in gross, however,
is purely personal, and is owned independently of any other ownership of realty.
For example, a grant to A of the right to fish on the land of X, confers an ease-
ment in gross on A. 1 MoRDEcAi's LAw LECtUrES 469 (2d ed. 1916). This is
connected with the requirement that there be a servient and a dominant tenement,
for if the covenantee has no estate to which the covenant may appertain or attach,
it is purely personal, and usually ends with the death of the covenantee.
"Post v. Bailey, 110 W. Va. 504, 159 S. E. 524 (1931).
Village of Dwight v. Hayes, 150 Ill. 273, 37 N. E. 218 (1894).
,Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881); Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276
(1834) (covenant by grantee).
"Bryan v. Grossee, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 499 (1909); Davis v. McCarthy,
131 App. Div. 755, 116 '. Y. Supp. 149 (1910), aff'd suithout opinion, 198 N. Y.
581, 92 N. E. 1083 (1910).
"6 North Carolina, however, has said, ... the easement of light and air, some-
times called the 'Ancient Window Doctrine,' does not apply in this State." Davis
v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 599, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
17 Kettle River R. R. v. Eastern R. R., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N. W. 469 (1889);
1 THompsox, op. cit. supra note 4, §375.
'
8 Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. 2d 792
(1937).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
change will be made in the front of the building19 constitute reciprocal
easements. Agreements between parties to a deed that they will dedicate
a strip for a road;20 that the grantor will have water pumped into a
reservoir on the land of the grantee ;21 that space will be kept open "for
the passage of teams ;,22 that the grantor will erect no building within a
certain distance of the property conveyed ;23 or that the grantee will
"build and maintain a suitable wagon road crossing at the grade,"24 have
been held to create easements because the covenant concerned land or its
use, and the creation of an easement was necessary in order to give effect
to the manifest intention of the parties. When adjoining property owners
mutually covenanted that none of the properties would be used or occu-
pied by persons of Negro descent, 25 or that each would observe a certain
building line,2 6 an easement was created in favor of each property owner
in all property covered by the agreement, which inured to the benefit of
his successors in interest. Restrictions placed upon lots conveyed by a
common grantor as part of a general scheme for the benefit of the land,
requiring grantees to set back the front walls of structures 27 or restric-
tions on the use of the property,2 8 have all been held to give each
grantee, as appurtenant to his land, an easement in every other lot
covered by the deeds, binding on and enforceable by and against each
owner's successor in interest.
A release of a claim for damages 29 caused by a particular under-
taking or occurrence on the land of the released party is given the effect
of a covenant creating an easement in favor of and appurtenant to the
property of the released party. In an action for damages arising out
of the flooding of the plaintiff's land, the defendant showed a release
executed by the plaintiff's predecessor in title in favor of defendant.3 0
" First Nat'l Bank of Portsmouth v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 71 N. H. 547,
53 Atl. 1017 (1902).2 0 United New Jersey R. R. & Canal Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 86 N. J. Eq.
258, 98 At. 1087 (1916), affirining decree 85 N. J. Eq. 7, 95 Atl. 243 (Ch. 1915).
"1 Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).2 Morton v. Thompson, 69 Vt. 432, 38 Atl. 88 (1897).
2" Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253 (1887) ; Hennen v. Deveny,
71 W. Va. 629, 77 S. E. 142 (1913).
" Beck v. County of Lane, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P. 2d 594 (1933).
" Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938) ; Porter v. Johnson,
232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S. W. 2d 529 (1938).
26 Wetmore v. Bruce, 118 N. Y. 319, 23 N. E. 303 (1890).
27 Brandenburg v. Lager, 272 Ill. 622, 112 N. E. 321 (1916) ; Gilbert v. Reper-
tory Co., 302 Mass. 105, 18 N. E. 2d 965 (1939).
2 Scheuer v. Britt, 217 Ala. 196, 115 So. 237 (1928) (lots sold for residential
purposes only) ; State ex rel. Britton v. Mulloy, 332 Mo. 1107, 61 S. W. 2d 741(1933) (property to be used only for residential purposes) ; Schwab v. Whitmore
Rauber & Vicinus Co., 245 App. Div. 174, 281 N. Y. Supp. 30 (1935); Kokenge v.
Whetstone, 60 Ohio App. 302, 20 N. E. 2d 965 (1935).
2" The release of both presently existing and future claims were here con-
templated.
"
0Brush v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 138 Atl. 860 (1927).
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The court held that this was not merely a revocable license, but was the
grant of an easement or estate in lands binding on the grantees of the
predecessor in title. In an action to restrain the defendant from pollut-
ing a stream with mine tailings, the defendant produced a release from
the grantor of the plaintiff, and the court held that the release was bind-
ing on the plaintiff as it created an easement in the watercourse.8 1
Owners of land in executing a release of a railroad from all claims
incident to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the road,
thereby created an easement appurtenant to the property of the railroad,
binding on their heirs and assigns.3 2 Similarly, where plaintiff's pred-
ecessor in title executed a release for himself and all those claiming
under him of all causes of action arising out of the erection of a build-
ing in the street in front of his property, the court found that the
release created an easement. It held that if the owner could grant to
another the right to make a certain use of his land, he necessarily could
bind his successors in title if he executed his will so as to charge his
successor with notice of such incumbrance.3 3 When a covenant not to
enforce a present or future right concerns land or its use, there seems
to be little argument against its being construed as constituting an ease-
ment in the land concerned.34
Some suggestion has been made that covenants creating easements
must be consistent with public policy,35 but such a limitation has not
often presented itself as an obstacle. In cases of releases executed in
favor of some objectionable enterprise, such as a sewage disposal plant3"
or a coal mine trash dump which emits noxious vapors and smoke,3 7
the courts have held that the land owner was not estopped to sue in a
situation where the released party was acting negligently or maliciously.
Indeed, the decision in the principal case38 appears to be limited to a
situation where' the garbage dump is being operated in a reasonably
careful and prudent manner.3 9 In a North Carolina case, the court
"Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942).
'
2 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Kearns, 71 Ohio App. 209, 48 N. E. 2d 1012 (1943).
"Walterman v. Village of Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663, 130 N. W. 479 (1911).
"There is no doubt in modern times that an attempted release of a future
right must be construed as amounting at least to a covenant not to enforce the
right whenever it arises." 6 WnLLisToN, CONTRACrS §1823 (Rev. ed. 1938).
'Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942) (release of right to sue
for pollution of watercourse held binding on releasors provided the deterioration
in quality of the watercourse was not so great as to constitute a public nuisance) ;
Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870) (construction of a covenant creating
an easement limited to a situation where the covenant was consistent with public
policy).
"J. T. Donohue Realty Co. v. Wagner, 154 Md. 588, 141 At. 337 (1928).
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mann, 298 Ky. 28, 181 S. W. 2d 394 (1944).
'
8 Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).
""We do not construe plaintiff's complaint to allege that the nuisance com-
plained of was the result of negligent conduct. . . ." Waldrop v. Town of Brevard,
233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).
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refused to accept the construction of a release by a lessee which would
have exempted the lessor from liability for the creation of such unsani-
tary conditions as would seriously impair the health of the lessee.40
As regards releases of any claims which may arise in the future from
acts of the released party which would otherwise give rise to an action in
tort, such agreements do not seem to be opposed to public policy 41
if the only effect is upon the property of the releasor. 42 A railroad may
even be released from liability for its negligence in damaging property
placed upon a portion of its right of way which had been leased to -the
owner of the damaged property. 43
North Carolina law concerning the creation of easements is rela-
tively scarce, although it seems to be in accord with the majority of
eases in other jurisdictions. In a previous case involving a release very
similar to the one in the principal case, the court held that a covenant
creating an easement is an interest in realty within the meaning of the
Statute of Frauds, and is required to be in writing.44 N. C. GEN. STAT.
§47-27 (1950) requires all easements to be recorded in order to be
binding upon bona fide purchasers for value.4 5 This serves as construc-
tive notice of the existence of the easement. 46 The North Carolina court
has held along with the majority that the intent to create the easement
must be clear ;47 that the creation of an easement must be needed in order
to give effect to the intention of the parties ;48 and that the easement must
be appurtenant to the dominant tenement in order to inure to the benefit
o Godfrey v. Power Co., 190 N. C. 24, 128 S. E. 485 (1925).
"Brush v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 138 Atl. 860 (1927).426 WmwsTo, CONRAcrs §1751B (Rev. ed. 1938).
" Southern Ry. v. Stearns Brothers, Inc., 28 F. 2d 560 (4th Cir. 1928).
"Clark v. A. C. L. R. R., 192 N. C. 280, 135 S. E. 26 (1926). The court
and the parties in the principal case seemed to treat the question as a case of first
impression in North Carolina, for the opinion and the briefs cite no North Caro-
lina authority for the proposition that a release may constitute a covenant not to
sue and create an easement.
" Walker v. Phelps, 202 N. C. 344, 162 S. E. 727 (1932) (covenant creating
easement held binding on all persons claiming under covenantor subsequent to
registration of the deed containing covenant).
40 The -principal case presents an interesting problem in this regard. There
the covenant which is construed as creating an easement was not contained in any
deed in the plaintiff's direct chain of title, yet such easement was binding upon him
because the deed in which it was contained was recorded. This would seem to
cast a greater burden of care on the part of those searching titles not only to
examine carefully every deed in the chain of title, but also to carefully examine,
analyze and construe all other deeds executed by each grantor in the chain. In
the situation of a grantor making a large number of grants out of a single tract,
any one of which might contain such a covenant binding all other realty in the
same tract, the problem and task involved would approach unreasonable magnitude.
'1 Ring v. Mayberry, 168 N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846 (1915) ; Norfleet v. Cromwell,
64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870).
"8 "The words are strictly of covenant, and a construction converting them into
a grant can only be justified if supported by some direct authority, or very clearly
'by the reason of the thing.'" Blount v. Harvey, 51 N. C. 186, 188 (1858).
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of the successors in interest of the covenantee, and not merely in gross.40
The few cases decided in North Carolina seem to contemplate the
existence of both a dominant and a servient tenement, and at least one
case has held that the covenant so creating the easement must conform
to public policy.50 The North Carolina court has expressed no opinion
as to whether the covenant would be objectionable if it interfered with
alienation, and has had no occasion to decide whether the dominant
tenement must be described with particularity; whether the dominant
tenement must receive substantial benefit from the easement created;
nor whether the dominant and servient tenements must be contiguous.
There is, however, no indication that the North Carolina court would
find itself in disagreement with these requirements, which have been
dealt with in other jurisdictions, if the question were properly presented.
Regarded in the light of the foregoing discussion, the decision in the
principal case does not seem to be out of line with the holdings of the
majority and the court seems to have adhered to the principles announced
in earlier cases in North Carolina.
WILLIAM C. MORRIS, JR.
Labor Law-Arbitration in North Carolina
Arbitration, as a means of settling commercial and property disputes
without resort to the judicial system, was authorized by statute in colo-
nial North Carolina' and was commonly used, as shown by the number
of cases which reached the Supreme Court, in the early days of state-
hood.2 However, it was not until two hundred years after the first
"Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 598, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
o Covenant was held to create an easement running with the lands, and bind-
ing upon a subsequent purchaser in fee. The court added: "This decision is limited
to a case in principle like this: Where the intent to create an easement is clear,
where the easement is apparent, and where the covenant is consistent with public
policy, and so qualifies or regulates the mode of enjoying the easement, that if it be
disregarded, the easement created will be substantially different from that in-
tended." (Italics added.) Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870).
' Laws of 1749, North Carolina, "An Act for determining Differences by Arbi-
tration," adopting the English statute, 9 & 10 William III c. 15 (1698). 23 CLARK,
STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 325 (1904). This statute is no longer in
force. Simpson v. McBee, 14 N. C. 531 (1832).
2 Compare the number of arbitration cases in recent volumes with the fact that
eight cases between 1795 and 1801 are reported in the first three volumes of the
North Carolina reports. Early subject matters included disputes over land bound-
aries, a horse, and partnership accounts. It is difficult, however, to differentiate
early cases of court rules of reference by consent and voluntary ex curia arbi-
tration.
The rudimentary condition of the courts may have accounted for much early
resort to arbitration. Not until 1806 was there a superior court for each county.
Until 1818 there was _no separate supreme court. Adams, Evolutlo,; of Law in
North Carolina, 2 N. C. L. REv. 133, 138 (1924). In 1846, Governor Graham still
longed for a time when "all Law suits could 'be ended in one, or at most two
years from their commencement, instead of being, as they often are, transmitted
from father to son." JonNsoN, ANTE BE.LUm NORTH CAROLINA 638 (1937).
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colonial statute that the North Carolina Supreme Court dealt with its
first case of arbitration of a labor-management dispute.3
Trade-union organization reached North Carolina as early as 1854,4
but unionization of basic industry was not sufficient for labor arbitration
to warrant attention until the nineteen-thirties. 5 Increased organization
of labor and the work of the War Labor Board 6 during World War II
were key stimuli in the development of the current and widespread resort
to arbitration as a peaceful device for the settlement of industrial griev-
ances, 7 notwithstanding that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are
' Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950). Employer moved to vacate an award made by the
majority of a board of arbitration on the ground that the award was not within
the scope of the agreement. Employer had signed submission and participated in
hearing. Held: the award, interpreting holiday and overtime provisions, was within
the terms of the agreement and arbitrators had not exceeded their powers. Judg-
ment directing employer to comply therewith affirmed.
Cf. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 143 F. 2d 1015(4th Cir. 1944) (decision governed by federal railway labor statute).
'The Raleigh typographical union was organized in that year. 7th ANN.
REPORT, N. C. BUREAU OF LABOR & PRINTING 118 et seq. (1894). Mechanics'
associations, forerunners of modern trade unions, were formed as early as 1795 in
Wilmington and Fayetteville. JOHNSON, ANrE BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA 174(1937). The Knights of Labor had extensive organization in the state during the
1880's. MITCHELL, TEXTILE UNIONISM AND THE SOUTH C. 2 (1931). In 1900 there
were 82 known labor organizations in the state. 14th ANN. REPORT, N. C. BUREAU
OF LABOR & PRINTING 388-91 (1901). Chief Justice Clark addressed labor meet-
ings, frequently contributed articles to the AFL's "American Federationist," and
served as a National War Labor Board umpire during World War I. 2 BROOKS
AND LEFLER, THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK 191, 366, 439 (1950).
'Douty, Labor Unrest in North Carolina, 1932, 11 SOCIAL FORCES 579 (1933).
'UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, AaRTRaATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 36-38 (1946);
Comment, 40 ILL. L. REv. 526 (1946). Cf. Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitra-
tion, 13 Mo. L. REv. 143, 164 (1948).
" It is estimated that some 250 collective bargaining contracts are in effect in
North Carolina. State Department of Labor arbitrators handle some 25 cases
a year, although this agency is being more frequently named in contracts. Letter
to writer from Forrest H. Shuford, North Carolina Commissioner of Labor, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, April 19, 1951.
In the course of interviews with arbitrators in the field, it was learned that the
Charlotte, North Carolina office of the American Arbitration Association is
currently handling an annual volume of 100-125 labor arbitrations. It is under-
stood that the A.A.A. conducted several hundred labor arbitrations in North and
South Carolina during the last five years, but only one commercial arbitration.
In the 15-month period ending March, 1951, the Federal Mediation & Con-
ciliation Service nominated or appointed arbitrators in 224 cases in 15 Southern
and border states (including Maryland, West Virginia, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
and the District of Columbia, but not including Kentucky). For the same period
the national case-load was 870. Approximately 12 cases were in North Carolina.
The oil industry, which made the predominant use of the Service in the Southern
region, prefers direct appointments by the agency, a rather rare procedure, rather
than the usual nomination of panels from which the parties select the arbitrator.
Letter to writer from J. W. Greenwood, Jr., Associate Director, Federal Media-
tion & Conciliation Seriice, Washington, D. C., April 26, 1951.
These statistics of impartial agencies in no way indicate the frequency with
which the parties mutually agree upon an individual arbitrator and proceed to a
hearing. On the basis of interviews with arbitrators, it is indicated that at least
an additional 25% in case volume thus takes place in this region. The Cone Mills
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not judicially enforceable. 8
A survey will first be made of some aspects of the law of commercial
arbitration which comprises the common law that is applied, however in-
advisedly,9 to labor arbitration. This will be followed by an examination
of local contractual practices in respect to labor arbitration. Lastly, pos-
sible means of enforcement, taking into account the 1951 revision of the
North Carolina labor arbitration statute,' 0 will be dealt with.
The North Carolina court early recognized the desirability of com-
mercial and property arbitration, finding that it determines the dispute
"in an amicable and friendly manner,"" avoids "the rigorous applica-
tion of the rules of construction . . . [with the] endless subtlety of refine-
ment" in the law, and adjusts 'the controversies of men before a do-
mestic tribunal,' 2 unattended with expense, trouble or delay."' "The
policy of the law is in favor of settlements by arbitrators' 4 . . ." who
"are not bound to decide upon mere dry principles of law, but may
decide upon principles of equity and good conscience."' 15 Justice Seawell
declared that it is
"the policy of the law and the care of the courts to liberally sus-
tain this very effectual and valuable method of bringing con-
and TWUA-CIO are reported to agree upon arbitrators almost uniformly without
recourse to the contractual clause providing for impartial selection in event of a
deadlock.
Additional cases arise under contracts which provide for a permanent, named
arbitrator.
' Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 233 (1950); Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678 (1948). The Uniform
Arbitration Act, N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-544 et seq., is limited to existing disputes.
For an interesting summary of the North Carolina law where the contract pro-
vided for New York commercial arbitration, probably in order to avoid local legal
uncertainties, see Gantt v. Hurtado & Cia, Ltd., 297 N. Y. 433, 79 N. E. 2d 815
(1948). Quaere: is the scarcity of commercial arbitrations in the region, indicated
in footnote 7, supra, to be partially explained by such evasions? In any event, such
device would not be practical in labor arbitration.
'Judge-made common law rules* were "intended to throttle a technique that
society found useful." Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitra-
tion. Agreements, 17 U. OF CH. L. REv. 233, 238 (1950). Commercial arbitration
law and procedure "consists of confused, technical and contradictory doctrines."
6 WrLLISTOx, CONTRACrS §1929A (Rev. Ed. 1938).
10 C. 1103, N. C. 1951 Sess. Laws, rewriting N. C. GEN. STAT. §95-36.1 (1943)
et seq.
" Bryant v. Miller, 1 N. C. 398 (1801).
12 Borretts v. Patterson, 1 N. C. 126 (1799) ; Devereux v. Burgwin, 33 N. C.
490 (1850) ("judges of the parties' own choosing").
" Borretts v. Patterson, I N. C. 126 (1799); Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C.
217, 193 S. E. 21 (1937) ("simple and speedy method"); Leach v. Harris, 69
N. C. 532 (1873) ("cheap and speedy").
Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C. 19, 23 (1886) ; Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C.
6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891) ("arbitration is looked upon with great favor by the
courts").
1 "Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C. 19, 23 (1886) ; Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C.
250 (1832) (decision "according to right, and not according to law . . . influenced
by all moral and equitable considerations").
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
troversies to an end, considering that in many instances the
controversy may have a more friendly ending and a speedier
determination, and even a greater probability of justice between
the litigants than may be afforded by the more belligerent meth-
ods of trial in the courts of law."'16
Despite this sympathetic attitude, the North Carolina court has
considered itself bound by the common law doctrine of the revocability
of arbitration agreements.' 7 Since a dictum by Lord Coke in 1609,1s
the prevailing rule has been that either party may revoke his
agreement to arbitrate at any time prior to the rendering of the award.
Yet the breach of the agreement to arbitrate calls for damages,' 9 and
once the arbitration has been completed, the award may be recovered
in an action at law20 or specifically enforced in equity.
21
This anomalous situation22 by which the specific performance of
agreements to arbitrate is denied 23 has been deplored by learned judges24
M 1 Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N. C. 17, 20, 21 S. E. 2d 836, 837 (1942). In Clark
Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 140, 75 S. E.
944, 949 (1912), the Court laid down these "well-settled principles": Arbitrators
"are not bound to decide according to law, when acting within the scope of their
authority, being the chosen judges of the -parties and a law unto themselves, but
may award according to their notions of justice and without assigning any rea-
son. . . . The policy of the law favors settlements by arbitration and, therefore,
leans liberally and partially towards them, extending its favor in support of this
amicable method of settlement." See Leach v. Harris, 69 N. C. 532 (1873) ("lib-
erally construed . . . without regard to technicalities or refinement").
" Brown v. Moore, 229 N. C. 406, 50 S. E. 2d 5 (1948) ; Tarpley v. Arnold,
226 N. C. 679, 40 S. E. 2d 33 (1946). Earliest dictu was in Norfleet v. Southall,
7 N. C. 189 (1819). See Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E.
902 (1910), regarded as the leading case. Cf. Gantt v. Hurtado & Cia, Ltd., 297
N. Y. 433, 79 N. E. 2d 815 (1948).
" Vynior's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 302 (K. B. 1609).
"' See Wynne v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 179 N. C. 320, 102 S. E. 403
(1920) ; STURGES, COMMERCIAL AmITRATIONS AND AWNARDs §§22, 84 (1930).
0 Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C. 217, 193 S. E. 21 (1937) ; Metcalf v. Guthrie,
94 N. C. 447 (1886); Simpson v. McBee, 19 N. C. 229 (1837).
2 Thompson v. Dean, 59 N. C. 22 (1860) ("the' submission and award, to-
gether, amounted to an agreement . . . plainly executory in its nature. . . . The
enforcement of such an agreement, specifically, is a familiar subject of equity
jurisdiction."). And see Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N. C. 447 (1886); Crawford v.
Orr, 84 N. C. 246 (1881).
2" This is especially true in the labor field, where collective bargaining contracts
commonly base the no-strike, no-lockout clause on the very availability of griev-
ance and arbitration procedures. The union's right to strike is preserved on matters
"not subject to arbitration." AGREEMENT BETWEEN ERWmI MILLs, INC., AND TEX-
TILE WORxERS UNION OF A~mIcA-CIO (Erwin, N. C., Oct. 11, 1950) Art. X,
p. 25. See N.L.R.B. v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F. 2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) where
findings of the employer's unfair labor practices were over-ruled because the union,
even in the absence of a no-strike clause, could not strike where grievance pro-
cedures were provided.
"' See Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911).
" Cardozo, J. in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288
(1921); Hough, J. in U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (D. C., N. Y. 1915); Frank, J. in Kulukundis Shipping Co.
v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 982-985 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; Judge Allen
in Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911), re-
viewed older criticism of the common law rule in other jurisdictions.
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and overturned by statutes2 5 or judicial holdings20 in many states.
Various arguments have been offered to justify the common law doc-
trine: that arbitration agreements are inherently revocable ;27 that they
"oust the jurisdiction" of the courts28 and are against the interest of
judges;29 that they are against public policy.3 0 On the other hand,
agreements to arbitrate labor disputes are today everywhere encour-
aged.3 1 The North Carolina court has now adopted this favorable view
as to labor arbitrations,3 2 a policy asserted by statute since 1945.38
The Uniform Arbitration Statute, adopted in North Carolina in
1927,34 applies only to agreements to arbitrate already existing disputes
-making these enforceable and irrevocable. 85 The statutory method
has been construed as being concurrent with, and not exclusive of, the
common law method of arbitration.38 Since labor arbitration is generally
based on an agreement to submit future disputes arising during the
contract term, this statute has been of no aid.8 7 The 1951 revision of
the North Carolina labor arbitration act3 8 provides:
"
5 Statutory situation surveyed in CooK's CASES oN EQuiTY 456 (4th Ed. 1948);
Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U.
oF CHi. L. REV. 233, 238-242 (1950) ; Note, 43 ILL. L. R'v. 678 (1948).
"Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296
N. W. 475, 135 A. L. R. 59 (1941) ; Ezell v. Rocky Mtn. Bean and Elevator Co.,
76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925).
27 Vynior's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 302 (K. B. 1609).
.'Originating in Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746). See Williams v. Bran-
ning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911) ; Kelly v. Trimont Lodge, 154
N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764 (1910). Termed "a quaint explanation" in Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 983 (2nd Cir. 1942).
2" Judicial competition for fees was ascribed as the original reason for the
doctrine by Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery, 25 L. J. Ex. 308, 313 (1855)
("a great scramble in Westminster Hall for the division of the spoil .... jealously
of arbitrations"). Noted as a possible motive in Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
"See Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869 (1927) ; Nelson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
"See §108 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §101 et
seq. (1947) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.
S. 50 (1944); Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn.
182, 296 N. W. 475, 135 A. L. R. 59 (1941); Note, 28 N. C. L. REV. 225, 228
(1950).
" Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§95-36.1 to 95-36.7 (1950), as revised by c. 1103, 1951
N. C. Sess. Laws.
"1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-544 to 1-567 (1943). See Sturges, Arbitration uinder
the New North Carolina Arbitration Statute-the Uniform Arbitration Act, 6
N .C. L. REv. 363 (1928).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-544 (1943).
"Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C. 217, 193 S. E. 2d 21 (1937).
Although nearly all labor disputes are arbitrated under written submission
agreements, few of these would bring themselves within the statutory terms so
as to be irrevocable. Cf. Andrews v. Jordan, 205 N. C. 618, 172 S. E. 319 (1934)
which seems to require, in order for the statute to be applicable, that the sub-
mission agreement expressly invoke the statute.
"C. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws (§§95-36.1 to 95-36.10).
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"Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Award. (a)
Written agreements to arbitrate labor disputes, including but
not restricted to controversies relating to wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, shall be valid, enforceable and irrev-
ocable, except upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for
the rescission or revocation of any contract, in either of the fol-
lowing cases:
"(i) Where there is a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement or any other contract, hereafter made or extended,
for the settlement by arbitration of a controversy or contro-
versies thereafter arising between the parties;
"(ii) Where there is an agreement to submit to arbitration
a controversy or controversies already existing between the
parties.
"(b) Any arbitration award, made pursuant to an agreement
of the parties described in subsection (a) of this Section and in
accordance with this Article shall be final and binding upon the
parties to the arbitration proceedings."
The Act applies only to voluntary agreements to arbitrate labor dis-
putes, including, but not restricted to, controversies respecting wages,
hours and other conditions of employment. The statutory purpose is to
enable the parties to carry on labor arbitration according to the terms
of their own agreement, the Act specifically refraining from imposing
statutory terms insofar as the contract provides otherwise on such
matters as rules of procedure, fees, selection of arbitrators, and time
limits. In addition to making agreements to arbitrate enforceable, the
General Assembly strengthened the role of the state Department of
Labor through the panel of arbitrators, in the labor arbitration process
in North Carolina.
At least four out of every five collective bargaining contracts now
provide for some sort of arbitration.3 9 A study of arbitration provisions
in 71 current or very recent contracts in the South4" indicates some of
the prevailing practices. The vast bulk of labor arbitration in the region
is concerned with disposition of grievances arising during a collective
bargaining agreement.41 Typically, arbitration is the terminal step of a
"Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. R1v.
160 (1950). Of 1,482 contracts analyzed, 83 percent provided for arbitration. For
its local significance, this survey indicates that in the textile industry such pro-
visions are most frequent, while in the tobacco industry less than half of the
contracts have arbitration clauses.
4" The sample studied by the writer consisted of 30 North Carolina contracts,
14 from South Carolina, 7 each from Georgia and Tennessee, 6 each from Virginia
and Alabama, and one covering several Southern states. Industrially, 42 were in
textile, 7 in auto, steel or metals, 4 each in paper and hosiery, 3 each in chemicals,
transportation and furniture, and 5 from scattered industries. Over 100 separate
plants and local unions were covered, with all branches of organized labor
represented.
" All the contracts studied provided for grievance arbitration. Only four had
clauses indicating the possibility of wage or contract-term arbitration. Over one-
half of the contracts specifically excluded wages from the arbitration provision.
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
grievance procedure which commences with the employee or union
steward taking the disputed matter up with the foreman, and with its
being intermediately referred, if necessary, to successively higher levels
of union and management personnel for bilateral settlement.
A majority of the contracts studied provide for the use of a 3-man
board of arbitration.4 2 Forty-five percent of the contracts provide for
a single arbitrator.4 3 These generally contemplate ad hoc arrange-
ments for each case. In only four contracts were individuals designated
by name to serve for the entire contract period.4 4 Provision is usually
made for the use of an impartial agency in resolving a deadlock in the
selection of the single arbitrator, or the "neutral" third member of the
board.4 5 Nationally, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is
most commonly used.4 6 While thirty percent of the Southern contracts
name the federal Service, over one-half resort to a private agency, the
American Arbitration Association. 47 A few in North Carolina refer
to the state Commissioner of Labor.
42 However, of the 39 contracts which provided for a tripartite board, 7
permitted a single arbitrator if the parties so agreed in particular cases. One
contract set up a 5-man board with two appointees each by the employer and
the union. AGREEMENT, MEAD CORP. AND UNITED PAPERWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO(Lynchburg, Va., Sept. 16, 1948) Art. X (3), p. 14.
"'Few of the 32 contracts providing for 1-man arbitration were outside of
the textile and hosiery industries.
"95% of the contracts provided for ad hoc arbitration. It is worth noting
that the permanent arrangements were generally at plants where collective bar-
gaining had been established for some years. In practice, parties with written
ad hoc provisions may occasionally have informal understandings whereby a certain
individual is appointed regularly.
a board of three arbitrators, one to be appointed by the Company, one
to be appointed by the Union, and a third to be designated by the American Arbi-
tration Association." AGREEMENT, THOMASVILLE CHAIR Co. AND UNITED FURNI-
TURE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO (Thomasville, N. C., Sept. 16, 1950) Art. V.§1, p. 11. An unusual provision is for two agencies to make the selection. "...
the parties shall endeavor to select an arbiter. Should they be unable to mutually
agree within twenty-four hours, then either party may apply to the Director of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Commissioner of Labor
of the State of North Carolina, who shall . . . be jointly authorized to promptly
furnish such impartial arbiter." AGREEMENT, HIGHLAND COTTON MILLS AND TEX-
TILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (High Point, N. C., June 9, 1949) §IV
(a), p. 7.
" Arbitration. Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
160, 164 (1950). However, this study showed that the largest group of contracts,
37% of those analyzed, failed to provide any predetermined method of breaking
a deadlock over selection of an arbitrator. Compare this with the instant Southern
sample which indicated only 3 contracts of the 71 studied without such provisions.
In Warren and Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAm. REL. IV.
200, 206 (1951), it is shown that both employers and unions prefer selection by the
parties themselves as first choice, but that unions, in case of a deadlock, prefer
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation by a four-to-one margin.
"' American Arbitration Association is designated in 39 contracts; the federal
service is named in 21. However, 36 of the A. A. A. clauses are in textile or
hosiery contracts, in which group the federal service is seldom designated. See
KEL.LoR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 176 (1948) (by 1946 there were over 400 A. A. A.
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Agreements generally provide for speedy determinations as planned
by the parties by including strict time limits for selecting the arbi-
trators,4 8 and often by requiring that the hearing and decision take
place within a matter of days.49 All except one5o of the contracts studied
provide that the employer and union share the costs of arbitration. In
the textile industry, special types of arbitration are sometimes provided
for work-load cases as contrasted with ordinary grievances. 51
Usually, contracts limit the arbitrator's authority to the "interpre-
tation and application" of the contract terms.52 Several rigidly restrict
the arbitrator's jurisdiction to specified types of disputes 53 or exclude
clauses in the textile industry). In other industries, the situation conformed more
to the national pattern. See footnote 46, supra. Evidence of compromise, whereby
the A. A. A. and the federal service are the appointing agency for alternate
3-month periods, appear in some contracts. AGREEMENT, W. VA. PULP & PAPER
CO. AND INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF PAPERMAKERS, AFL (Charleston, S. C., July 1,
1948) p. 10.
" Typically, 24 to 72 hours. See footnote 45, smpra,. "Within forty-eight (48)
hours after written demand for arbitration the two parties shall meet and endeavor
to select an arbiter. Should they be unable to mutually agree within twenty-four(24) hours, then either party may apply" to the impartial agency. AGREEMENT,
JEWEL COTTON MILLS, INC. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO
(Thomasville, N. C., Dec. 9, 1950) §V (a), p. 8.
"9 Decision must be rendered within 5 days of conclusion of hearing. AGREE-
MENT, UNIVERSAL MOULDED PRODUCTS CORP. AND INT'L WOODWORKERS ASS'N,
CIO (Bristol, Va.-Tenn., May 9, 1950) p. 5. Board to meet day after appoint-
ment, and every day thereafter, except Sunday, until decision reached. AGREEMENT,
BIRMINGHAM ELECTRIC CO. AND AMAL. ASS'N, STREET AND ELECTRIC Rwy. EM-
PLOYEES OF AMERICA (Birmingham, Ala., Mar. 28, 1950), p. 2. See Brotherhood
of Rwy. Clerks v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 143 F. 2a 1015 (4th Cir. 1944) ("Time
is of the essence in arbitration at common law . . ."); Long v. Cromer, 181
N. C. 354, 107 S. E. 217 (1921). In practice, stipulations often waive the
specific requirements in order to avoid the potential danger of an invalid award
-if rendered subsequent to the fixed date.
" Losing party shall pay arbitration fees and expenses. AGREEMENT, CLIFTON
MFG. Co. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Clifton and Con-
verse, S. C., Apr. 25, 1950) p. 10.
"1 On technical matters, a 3-man board; on non-technical questions, a single
arbitrator. AGREEMENT, ERWIN MILLS, INC. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, CIO (Durham, N. C., Oct. 11, 1950) Art. IX(A) (1) (2), pp. 23-24.
On work-load cases, the arbitrator must be: "a competent technician familiar with
time studies," AGREEMENT, FIELDcREST MILLS AND TWUA-CIO (Leaksville-Spray,
N. C., Feb. 28, 1949) p. 18; "firm of qualified industrial engineers," AGREEMENT,
AMERICAN ENKA CORP. AND UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Ashe-
ville, N. C., May 26, 1950) Art. XII(B), p. 23; "an arbiter competent in the
field." AGREEMENT, NEWBERRY TEXTILE MILLS AND UTWA-AFL (Newberry, S.
C., Feb. 28, 1948) p. 10. Cf. Norfleet v. Southall, 7 N. C. 189 (1819) (arbitration
"calls for a knowledge of a peculiar kind, and a familiarity with customs and
practices").
'- "... jurisdiction and authority to interpret and apply the provisions of this
agreement . . .no jurisdiction or authority to add to. take from, or modify any of
the terms." AGREEMENT. ERWIN MILLS INC. AND TWUA-CIO (Durham, N. C.,
Oct. 11, 1950) Art. IX(B), p. 24, ". .. all grievances and complaints concerning
violations of or noncompliance with the agreement," GENERAL LABOR RELATIONS
AGREEMENT. REYNOLDS ALLOY CO. AND INTL COUNCIL OF ALUMINUJM WORKERS
UNIONS, AFL (Listerhill, Ala., Apr. 22, 1949) p. 24.
" Listed eight articles to which grievances are limited. AGREEMENT, AMERICAN
BEMBERG AND UTWA-AFL (Elizabethton, Tenn., Sept. 1, 1950) p. 8.
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listed issues from his authority.54 Occasionally, the contract expressly
details factors which must be weighed in reaching the decision.55 The
scope5" of the award, or more commonly, its form, r may be explicitly
limited. In practice, nothing resembling exclusionary rules of evidence
are used at the hearing, 58 and contract clauses may indicate the liberal
procedure desired by the parties.50 Arbitrators often visit the industrial
scene6° to view the performance of a particular job or otherwise to
acquaint themselves directly with the matters at issue.
"'Nearly always excluded in the Southern contracts studied is the question
of a general wage increase or decrease. Compare this with national study showing
only 14% of the contracts specifically excluding the general level of wages from
arbitration. Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 160, 162 (1950). Work loads and rates of pay excluded from arbitra-
tion. AGREEMENT, WOODSIDE MILLS AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
CIO (Greenville, S. C., Mar. 22, 1949) p. 7. All disputes covered except merit
increases and promotions of journeymen machinists. AGREEMENT, WRIGHT'S AUTO-
MATIC MACHINERY CO. AND INT'L ASS'N OF MACHINISTS (Durham, N. C., May 3,
1948) §16, p. 29. See footnote 41, supra.
" "The Board of Arbitration will base its determination of the matter upon
scientific time studies and shall use the procedural methods used by the Corpora-
tion in determining standards and incentive premiums." AGREEMENT, AMERICAN
ENKA CoRP. AND UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Asheville, N. C.,
May 26, 1950) Art. XII (B), p. 23. "In making his decision, the arbiter shall
keep in mind the competitive situation. . . ." AGREEMENT AND SHOP RULES, CO-
LUMBIA MILLS CO. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Columbia,
S. C., Aug. 22, 1949) §6 (b), p. 6.
" "All decisions shall be retroactive to the date the grievance was submitted to
the plant superintendent in writing. . ." AGREEMENT, GOLDEN BELT MFG. CO. AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Durham, N. C., Mar. 22, 1949)
§3, p. 4. No decision shall extend monetary benefits to an employee beyond 30 days
after notice of arbitration. AGREEMENT AND SHOP RULES, PACIFIC MILLS AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA (Columbia, S. C., July 17, 1948) §5(f),
p. 8.
" ,,... shall include his findings of fact and conclusions, shall be in writing...
AGREEMENT, ALEO MFG. Co. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO
(Rockingham, N. C., Aug. 15, 1949) Art. 9(6), p. 32. In labor arbitration prac-
tice, the awards are nearly always in writing. Compare this with the liberal
common law attitude where the submission is not specific. Ball-Thrash Co. v.
McCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916).
"8 See Singer, Labor Arbitration--Use of Legal Rules of Evidence, 2 LAB. L. J.
185 (1951). Cf. Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C. 6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891) (no power
to arbitrarily decline to receive evidence) ; Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C. 250 (1832)
(cannot hear witnesses privately without other party being present.)
" Arbitrators "shall promptly make such investigation, hear such evidence or
testimony and consider such matters as may be material .... Both the Company
and the Union shall be afforded full opportunity to present such evidence as they
may deem necessary, or as the arbiters shall request or demand." AGREEMENT,
CONE MILLS CORP., TABARDREY PLANT AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
CIO (Haw River, N. C., Dec. 6, 1950) §4(b), p. 6. The right to cross-examine
is sometimes specifically provided for. AGREEMENT, AMERICAN ENKA CORP. AND
UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Asheville, N. C., May 26, 1950)
Art. VI(E), p. 12.
"0 Land boundary disputes in common law arbitration frequently called for going
upon the land in controversy. Hemphill v. Gaither, 180 N. C. 604, 105 S. E. 183
(1920); Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C. 6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891); Thompson v.
Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860).
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The contract may require that the arbitrator have certain personal
qualifications such as technical experience 61 or residence. 2 An analysis
of the North Carolina Department of Labor's current twenty-member
voluntary arbitration panel0 3 gives some indication of the type of indi-
viduals engaged as arbitrators. 64 College professors, comprising fifteen
members of the panel, handle nearly all the cases; only four members
are practicing attorneys. 65
If one party to a collective bargaining contract which provides for
arbitration of future disputes refuses to arbitrate, specific performance
is the only adequate remedy. 66 The North Carolina court has never
squarely refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes,
but it has indicated by dicta that it would not do so. 6 7 The harsh com-
mon law rule of revocability, however, has been softened in its appli-
01 See footnote 51, supra.
' Must be a resident of Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, or Alabama, but
not a resident of six named counties near plant. AGREEMENT, DEBONAm FULL-
FASHIONED MILLS, INC. AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF HOSIERY WORKERS (Cleve-
land, Tenn., Nov. 18, 1948) p. 14. Shall not reside within 100 miles of plant.
AGREEMENT, AMERICAN ENxA CoRP. AND UTWA-AFL (Asheville, N. C., May 26,
1950) Art. VI (E) (6), p. 11.
"
3Most members of the panel are widely used in the South by the American
Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or, both.
0" All are white males. This does not seem to be solely a regional manifesta-
tion. The National Academy of Arbitrators reportedly has no Negro and only
two women members.
" One is a minister. None are merchants or businessmen. Three of the four
practicing attorneys are not known to have done any arbitration, and are not on
other panels. However, seven of the fifteen professors on the panel are teachers
of law and are among the most active arbitrators. See N. C. DEP'T OF LABOR, VOL-
UNTARY ARBITRATION: A SERVICE TO INDUSTRY AND LABOR 1-4 (1951). Attorneys
do appear for one or both of the parties in a large percentage of the cases in
the region. Cf. McDonald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators in Labor
Disputes, 1ST NYU ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 145, 149 (1948) indicating that lawyers
dominate the field of labor arbitration in the New York City area; Warren and
Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAB. RE. REV. 200, 205(1951) showing a union preference for professors as compared with attorneys, and
an exactly contra employer choice. Holmes foresaw the ideal lawyer of the future
as "the man of statistics and the master of economics." HOLMES, COLL. LEG.
PAPERS 187 (1920).
It may be that the local non-utilization of practicing attorneys as arbitrators has
historical roots. Cf. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 122, 211-239
(1911) for vigorously expressed anti-lawyer sentiment among farmers, especially
in the western part of the State. The Laws of 1801 provided that "no attorney
should be allowed to speak or admitted [sic] as counsel" before the then Supreme
Court. Gilliam v. Saunders, 204 N. C. 206, 208, 167 S. E. 799, 800 (1933).
Another facet of this sentiment was that laymen were appointed appellate judges,
including John Williams, J., an "unlettered" carpenter. Battle, History of the
Supreme Court, 103 N. C. 445, 470 (1889).
00 Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 56 N. E. 2d 1 (1944) (specific
performance necessary to give members benefit of check-off provision of union
contract). Most of the applicable statutes authorize the court, inter alia, to direct
the parties to comply with the arbitration agreement. See Coo's CASES ON
EgurTy 456-462 (4th ed. 1948).
0 See cases in footnote 17, supra.
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cation and exceptions have been made to it.O8 In equity the particular
circumstances have been taken into account and the right to revoke
"this solemn agreement" has been made something less than an absolute
right.69 There have been intimations that the common law rule might
not be followed, but in the cases so hinting, the issue was not squarely
presented. 70 The facts in several holdings in which the court talked
about the danger of being ousted of its jurisdiction involved individual
plaintiffs who had agreed to arbitration by appointees of overpoweirng
organizations. 71 In any event, to regard common law revocability as
applying to agreements to arbitrate labor disputes is to invite the under-
mining of good labor relations in the plant.7 2
As has been seen, the 1951 revision73 of the North Carolina labor
arbitration act makes agreements to arbitrate future labor disputes
irrevocable and enforceable. This integrates into the law the require-
ments and practices of daily labor relationships. Commendable improve-
ments were made in various details of arbitration procedure. §95-36.9(a)
provides for securing a stay prior to answer or demurrer in any court
action pending "upon any issue referable to arbitration." However,
§95-36.9(b) (c) is open to question. It authorizes a court stay of the
arbitration proceedings on the ground that there has been no agreement
to arbitrate the controversy involved, if application is made within ten
days after notice of the issue. And it authorizes a court stay of the
arbitration award on the ground that it exceeds the arbitrator's au-
thority, if application is made within ten days after notice of the award.
Failure to apply for a stay does not preclude raising the issue before
the arbitrator or in enforcement proceedings, as the case may be. The
"' The determination of a single fact or the amount of loss, as in insurance
appraisal, is not against public policy. Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance
Co., 106 N. C. 28, 10 S. E. 1057 (1890). See Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911) ; Braddy v. N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 115 N.
C. 354, 20 S. E. 477 (1894).
"Despite the common law rule, "... in a court of equity ... the breaching of
this solemn agreement [to arbitrate] will be considered as a strong circumstance,
with other evidence, as to the right of the party who breached the agreement to
have a receiver appointed." Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869
(1927.)
7' Hargett v. Delisle, 229 N. C. 384, 49 S. E. 2d 739 (1948) ; Cox v. Hinshaw,
228 N. C. 102, 44 S. E. 2d 532 (1947); Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137
S. E. 869 (1927) ; Long v. Cromer, 181 N. C. 354, 107 S. E. 217 (1921) ; Wynne
v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 179 N. C. 320, 102 S. E. 403 (1920) ; Pretz-
felder & Co. v. Merchants Ins. Co., 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 (1895) ; Islay v.
Stewart, 20 N. C. 297 (1838) ; Williams v. Wood, 12 N. C. 82, 88 (1826) (opinion
of Taylor, C.J.).
"Kelly v. Trimont Lodge, 154 N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764 (1910); Nelson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911) ; s. c., 167 N. C.
185, 83 S. E. 322 (1914) (see Clark, C. J., dissenting opinion).
"' See concurring opinion of Wolfe, J. in Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108
Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945) ; Note, 28 N. C. L. Rav. 225, 228 (1950).
13 C. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws (§§95-36.1 to 95-36.10).
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ten day limits are in keeping with the need for promptness. But will not
the stay provisions operate to encourage court tests of arbitrability of
issues, rather than, as heretofore, to leave arbitrability to be determined
by men experienced in labor relations and functioning in a tribunal gov-
erned by the contract of the interested parties ?74 Moreover, why resort
in such a hurry to a stay order, if the question of authority can be
litigated at the enforcement stages?
A recent U. S. District Court decision in North Carolina75 upholds
the injunctive enforcement of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes
under §301 of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act.7 6 This is
based on a liberal construction of that statute as creating a new federal
substantive right, independent of state law. It is supported by two U. S.
Court of Appeals decisions.77 Another device to effectuate the arbitra-
tion agreement, avoiding the common law doctrine of revocability and
equity's tight adherence thereto, is the declaratory judgment.78 A
court's declaration in construing the agreement that the defendant is
under a duty to arbitrate might get results without coercive relief. If
that were needed, it could be supplied later. One potential lever, of
course, is the resort to economic weapons. 79
" The question of the arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority is often a pre-
liminary issue at the hearing. For recent examples of such arbitration cases in
North Carolina, see In re A. D. Julliard & Co., 15 L. A. 934 (1951) ; In re Cale-
donia Mills, Inc., 15 L. A. 474 (1950) ; In re Aleo Mfg. Co., 15 L. A. 715 (1950).
The latter award was later subject to litigation in the case cited in footnote 75,
infra. Few contracts specifically anticipate the right of the parties to go into
court later, as does that in AGREEMENT, THOMAS CAR WORKS, INC. AND UNITED
AUTo WORKERS, CIO (High Point, N. C., Feb. 15, 1949) Art. VI, p. 11, where
the arbitration decision is "final and binding . . . provided that full legal rights
of the parties in the courts shall not be restricted in any way."
"' Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.
D., N. C. 1950). Another local complaint has been filed to enforce a collective
bargaining contract, including its arbitration provisions. Raleigh (N. C.) News &
Observer, April 12, 1951, §2, p. 29, col. 6.
" 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
'17 Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); American Fed. of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 179 F. 2d 535
(6th Cir. 1950).
" Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Texoma Natural Gas Co., 146 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir.
1944) ; Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo. Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626
(M. D., N. C. 1950); Northland Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n,
66 F. Supp. 431 (1946).
7" This is succinctly stated in some contracts. "As to any dispute subject to
arbitration, the Union agrees that it will not authorize or support any strike....
As to any dispute not subject to arbitration, the Company agrees that the Union
. ..shall have the right to strike. . . ." AGREEMAENT, A. D. JUILLIARD & Co. AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AmERICA, CIO (Brookford, N. C., April 14, 1949)
§XV(a) (b), p. 24. On enforcement of awards, the hint of potential economic
force is sometimes equally clear. "Union reserves the right to strike if the
Company fails to carry out the decision of the Arbitrator within 10 days after
receipt of his decision in writing; the Company reserves the right to lockout... :'
AGREEMENT. PowELL KNITTING CO. AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF Hosim£y
WORKERS (Spartanburg, S. C., Sept. 1, 1949) Art. X, p. 16.
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What will be the scope of judicial review of labor arbitration awards
under the new North Carolina statute? It contemplates two grounds :80
arbitrability and the arbitrator's authority. The Thoma.sville Chair
case,81 which preceded the statute, involved only the latter. The Uni-
form Act codifies the usual common law grounds:82 charges of bias,
corruption, denial of due process and lack of authority, but, it is not
directly applicable to labor arbitration. Perhaps the grounds mentioned
would be available as at common law, as they are not excluded by the
new act. Traditionally, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has been liberal in sustaining arbitration awards and hearing pro-
cedures.8 3
M. H. Ross.
Labor Law-Unemployment Compensation-Geographical Scope
of Labor Dispute Disqualification
Due to a shortage of parts, which was caused by a strike of the
United Auto Workers-C.I.O. local in Dearborn, Michigan, the Ford
Motor Company closed its assembly plants throughout the country.
These assembly plant employees, members of the U.A.W.-C.I.O., but
of different locals, filed claims for unemployment compensation in at
least four states.- From commission decisions allowing the claims,
so §95-36.9(c) of c. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws.
"
1Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950). In reviewing the scope of the arbitrator's authority,
the narrow common law attitude toward the role of compromise, as expressed in
Cutler v. Cutler, 169 N. C. 482, 86 S. E. 301 (1915), would hardly apply to labor
disputes. This may be expressly set out in the contract. The arbitrator "is not
bound to render a 'Yes' or 'No' decision." AGREEMENT, HILLCREST HosimvY MILLS
AND AMERica FDERATi ON OF HOsIERY WORK ES (Durham, N. C., Mar. 12, 1949)
§3 (b), p. 7.
'IN. C. GENr. STAT. §1-559 (1943). See UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, ARiTRATION
OF LABOR DIsptrEs 126-28 (1946).
"Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N. C. 17, 21 S. E. 2d 836 (1942). "Anciently, the
construction of awards often turned on nice and subtle distinctions, and much
refinement . . . but a more liberal and sensible method has been introduced, and
the judges have invariably laid it down that the courts will intend everything
to support the awards. . . ." Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire In-
surance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 139, 75 S. E. 944, 948 (1912). "There is no right of
appeal, and this court has no power to revise the decision of judges who are
of the parties' own choosing. An award is intended to settle the matter in con-
troversy and thus save the expense of litigation. If a mistake be a sufficient ground
for setting aside an award it opens the door for coming into court in almost every
case .. . and arbitration instead of ending would tend to increase and encourage
litigation." Eaton v. Eaton, 43 N. C. 102, 105 (1851).
' Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Virginia.
For discussion of disqualification due to a labor dispute in general see, 17 U.
OF CaICAGO L. RxZv. 294 (1950); 49 CoL. L. REV. 550 (1949); 33 MINN. L. Rv.
758 (1949); 49 YA.iF L. J. 461 (1940); 55 YALE L. J. 167 (1945). See also
49 MIcH. L. Rav. 886 (1951) for discussion of the "Effect of the Merits of ,
Labor Dispute on the Right to Benefits."
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the Ford Motor Company appealed 2 on the theory that the Ford plant
in Michigan and the assembly plants in other states are so closely inte-
grated as to constitute one establishment within the meaning of the
disqualification sections of the Unemployment Compensation Acts.8
These statutes generally provide that a claimant shall be disquali-
fied if the work stoppage is due to a labor dispute at the "establish-
ment"4 or at the "factory, establishment, or other premises"5 at which
he is or was last employed. 6 Construing a statute of the latter type,
the Virginia Court,7 following the decision in New Jersey,s held that
'Ford Motor Co. v. Abecrombie, 62 S. E. 2d 209 (Ga. 1950); Nordling v.
Ford Motor Co., 42 N. W. 2d 576 (Minn. 1950) ; Ford Motor Co. v. N. J. Dep't
of Labor and Industry, 5 N. J. L. 494, 76 A. 2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 28 (Va. 1951).
The disqualification sections of the various statutes are as follows: A.A. CODE
ANN. tit. 26, §214 A (Supp. 1946) ; ALAsxA ComP. LAWS §51-5-4 (d) (1949) ; ARiz.
CODE ANN. §56-1004 (d) (Supp. 1946) ; AiK. Dis. STAT. §81-1106 (d) (Supp.
1946) ; CAL. GEN. LAWS act 8480d, §56 (a) (1944) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 167 A,§5 (c) (Supp. 1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §7508 (3) (1949); DEL. Rv. CODE
c. 207, No. 6 (1943) ; D. C. CoDE tit. 46, §310 (f) (Supp. 1948) ; FLA. STAT. ANN:§443.06 (4) (Supp. 1948); GA. CODE ANN. §54-610 (d) (Supp. 1947) ; HAWAIi REV.
LAWS §4231 (d) (1945); IDAHO CODE §72-1366 (j) (1949) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 48,§223 (d) (1949); IND. STAT. ANN. §52-1539 c. (Burns 1947); IOWA CODE ANN.§96.5.4 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. §44-706 (d) (Corrick 1947); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. §341.360 (1) (Baldwin 1948); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4434.4 (d) (Dart
1947); ME. L. c. 430, No. 15-IV (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95 A, §5 (e)(Flack 1947); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 151 A, §25 (b) (1942); MicH. STAT. ANN.§17-531 (b) (Reis 1947); MINN. STAT. ANN. §268.09 Subd. 1(6) (West 1945);
Miss. CODE ANN. §7379 (e) (Supp. 1948); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §9431 1I (a)(Cum. Supp. 1948); MONT. REv. CODES §3033.8 (d) (Supp. 1939); NE. REv.
STAT. §48-628 (d) (1943); NEv. COMP. LAWS ANN. §2825.05 (d) (Supp. 1145);N. H. REv. LAWS c. 218, §4D (1942), as amended N. H. L. c. 185 (1949) ; N. J.
STAT. ANN. §43:21-5 (d) (Supp. 1948); N. M. STAT. ANN. §57-805 (d) (Supp.
1947); N. Y. LAI. LAW §592.1 (McKinney 1948); N. C. GEN. STAT. §96-14 (d)(1950); N. D. REv. CoDE §52-0602.4 (1943); OHIO CODE ANN. §1345-6d(1) (Throckmorton 1948); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §215 (d) (Supp. 1948);
ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. §126-705 (d) (Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.43, §402 (d) (Purdon 1948), as amended, PA. L. AcT 530 (1949); R. I. GEa.
LAWS c. 284, §7(4) (1938); S. C. CoDE ANN. §7035-82 (d) (1942) ; S. D. CODE§17.0830 (4) (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §6901.29E (Michie Supp. 1948); TEx.
STAT. REV. Civ. art. 5221B-3 (d) (Vernon 1947); UTAH CODE ANN. §42-2a-5 (d)(1943); VT. L. H. 212, §5379V (1949) ; VA. CODE ANN. §1887 (97) (d) (1942);
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §9998-105 (f) (Supp. 1943); W. VA. CODE ANN.§2366 (78) (4) (1943); WIS. STAT. No. 108.04 (10) (Brossard 1947); Wyo.
Comp. STAT. ANN. §54-105B II (1945).
'Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have this type statute.
'This is the most common type statute. With the exception of Idaho, whichhas no comparable provision, Texas, which adds the word "vessel" to the usual
trio, and Utah, which speaks of "factory or establishment," all jurisdictions not
listed in footnote four have this phraseology.
'Regardless of which phraseology is used the problem of determining the
geographical scope of the labor dispute disqualification is substantially the same.
Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 26 (Va.
1951).
Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 28(Va. 1951).
Ford Motor Co. v. N. J. Dep't of Labor and Industry, 5 N. J. 494, 76 A.
2d 256 (1950).
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the claimants were entitled to compensation. These courts based their
decision upon the theory that the legislative intent0 in using the word
"establishment" was an indication that the beneficence of the act em-
braced businesses other than factories, such as banks, hotels, and thea-
ters, but not ". . . to widen and extend the area or territorial scope [of the
disqualification section] beyond that encompassed by the companion
words 'factory' and 'other premises' "10
The Supreme Court of Georgia," supported by earlier decisions,1 2
reached a contrary result on the theory that the Michigan plant and
the assembly plants are so closely integrated as to constitute one estab-
lishment within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
This court, interpreting a statute13 identical with the Virginia statute,1 4
held that the words "factory" and "other premises" did not restrict
the meaning of the word "establishment" but that the general words
"other premises" were restricted by the preceding words "factory" and
"establishment."15
While the legislatures could have defined the meaning of the word
"establishment," they left the meaning to be determined by judicial in-
terpretation. Consequently, the courts' decisions must rest largely on
the purpose of the acts and of the disqualification sections. As the
Virginia Court points out, "The Unemployment Act... was intended to
provide temporary financial assistance to workmen who became un-
employed without fault on their part."' 0  With this statement all
D'The British act, predecessor of the American statutes, used the phrase "fac-
tory, workshop or other premises," clearly indicating a test of geographic prox-
imity. Was this test chaniged by substituting "establishment" for workshop?
See, 17 U. oF CEicAco L. REv. 294, 321 (1950) (where the question is answered
in the negative).
"Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 28,
33 (Va. 1951).
"Ford Motor Co. v. Abecrombie, 62 S. E. 2d 209 (Ga. 1950). This decision
reversed the Court of Appeals of Georgia which had followed the same reason-
ing as the Virginia and New Jersey courts. The Court of Appeals said, "...
at the factory, establishment, or other premises ... relates to the place where the
employee is thus engaged, that is, the geographical location of the factory, estab-
lishment, or other premises." Abecrombie v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Ga. App. 690,
59 S. E. 2d 664. 668 (1950).
12 Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87 (1941) ; Spielman v.
Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N. W. 1(1940) (both statutes used only
the word "establishment").1 GA. Cona ANN. §54-610 (d) (Supp. 1947).1 VA. CODE ANN. §60-47 (1942).
1" The Minnesota court construing its statute, which omits the words "factory"
and "or other premises," held that the claimants were entitled to compensation.
The court said, ". . . the solution of the problem lies in determining from all
the facts available whether the unit under consideration is a separate establish-
ment from the standpoint of employment and not whether it is a single enterprise
from the standpoint of management or for the more efficient production of goods."
Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 42 N. W. 2d 576, 588 (1950).
" Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 28,
33 (Va. 1951).
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courts agree; however, they disagree as to whether or not the em-
ployees are at fault in a situation similar to the one under consideration.
A minority of the courts' 7 have held that the employees are at
fault in such situations. These cases hold that the union is the agent' 8
of the individual members; therefore, members of the union are respon-
sible for the action of the union. Technically this view is sound;19
however, these courts overlook the practical aspects of union member-
ship.20
The majority2 ' view recognizing the remedial nature of the statutes
construe the disqualification section strictly so as to effectuate the gen-
eral purpose of the statute. But since the legislatures have clearly
shown an intent to disqualify those who participate in a labor dispute,
the courts are bound to give effect to this intent. The problem is how
best to do this without discriminating between workers and between
employers; and without "taking sides" in disputes between labor and
management. To date no complete solution has appeared.
There are two valid objections to allowing compensation to those
involuntarily unemployed due to a labor dispute existing in a geo-
graphical location other than that of the place of employment. One is
that a union might order a strike of only key employees knowing that
such a course would as effectively induce a complete work stoppage as
would a strike of all member employees, and that benefit payments to
all non-striking members would appreciably lessen the drain upon the
union treasury.
" Ford Motor Co. v. Abecrombie, 62 S. E. 2d 209 (Ga. 1950); Chrysler
Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87 (1941); Spielman v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N. W. 1 (1940).
"Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 209 Mich. 438 N. W. 87 (1941) (The court at
page 92 said, "whether we regard the employees as acting through their agent,
or treat them as third party beneficiaries .... the practical result is the same.") ;
Chrysler Corp. v. U. C. C., 301 Mich. 351, 3 N. W. 2d 302 (1942); Ford Motor
Co. v. Abecrombie, 63 S. E. 2d 209 (Ga. 1950).
0 Moen v. Director of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N. E. 2d
779 (1949) ; Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
161 Pa. Super. 630, 56 A. 2d 295 (1948).
"0 In the normal agency relationship the principal has the power to control
the conduct of his agent and if the agent disobeys the principal's orders the
relationship can be terminated, usually to the economic disadvantage of the
agent. It is absurd to assume that the individual member or minority membership
of a union can control the union's activity. Of course, the agency may be termi-
nated but only to the economic disadvantage of the principal.
"General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 11, 55 A. 2d 732 (1947) (in-
volved plants in different cities in Connecticut) (The Connecticut statute has
since been amended to disqualify a person unemployed due to a labor dispute
" . . at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or has been
employed, or at a factory, establishment or other premises operated by his em-
ployer in the state of Connecticut... !' CONN. GEN. STAT. §7508 (1949): Tucker
v. American Smelting and Refining Corp.. 189 Md. 250, 55 A. 2d 692 (1947)(plants several thousand miles apart) ; Ford Motor Co. v. N. J. Dep't of Labor
and Industry, 5 N. T. 494, 76 A. 2d 256 (1950) ; Nordling v. Ford Motor Co.,
42 N. W. 2d 576 (Minn. 1950): Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Comm'n, 63 S. E. 2d 28 (Va. 1951).
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The second objection is that such payments make the statutes dis-
criminatory against the employer who has different stages of produc-
tion in the plants which are geographically separated. He finds his
payments to the unemployment fund increased due to compensation
paid his non-striking, but idle workers, whereas the employer with
all stages of production under one roof has no increase since his idle
workers are disqualified and receive no compensation. 22
With these two objections in mind, it seems that any equitable
solution will require some other basis than geographical location. Yet,
any other basis seems also to have aspects of unfairness.23 Faced with
such a dilemma perhaps it would be wise for the legislatures to reex-
amine their reasons for any disqualification due to labor disputes.
The remedial aim of the Unemployment Compensation Acts is to
protect the health and general welfare of the claimants during a period
of temporary unemployment. Consequently, it seems that compensa-
tion should be allowed during a period of unemployment due to a
labor dispute. However, the compensation should not be large enough
to encourage strikes; the funds paid out during these periods should
not be charged against the individual employer; and the general fund
from which the payments are made should be at least partly financed
by contributions from the employees.
PAUL K. PLUNKETT.
2 "All the States finance unemployment benefits mainly by contributions from
subject employers on the wages of their covered workers; in addition two States(Alabama and New Jersey) collect employee contributions." COMPARISON OF
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS 13 (Dep't Labor 1949).
"All States laws have in effect some system of experience rating by which
individual employers' contribution rates are varied from the standard rate on
the basis of their experience with unemployment risk." COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 15 (Dep't Labor 1949).
22 Three states have tried to solve the problem of location of the labor dispute
by legislation. Connecticut specifically disqualifies a claimant whose unemploy-
ment is due to a labor dispute in any establishment operated by the employer
within the state. This does not. however, solve the problem even though the
legislative intent is made clear. The same objections can be made to this type of
statute as to those which do not make disqualification depend on state lines.
The Michigan statute specifically disqualifies workers who stop work voluntarily
in sympathy with striking employees in some other establishment or department of
the same employer and those who become unemployed indirectly because of a
stoppage of work in some other department or unit. This statute serves only
to complicate the problem since one of the major difficulties is to determine if the
employee's act was voluntary or otherwise. Oregon's statute includes in its dis-
qualification section a dispute at any other premise which the employer operates
if the dispute makes it impossible for him to conduct work normally in the estab-
lishment in which there is no labor dispute. This is probably the best statute if it
is assumed that an employee who is unemployed due to a labor dispute should be
disqualified.
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Liens-Contractors and Materialnen-Married Women's Property-
Husband's Power to Charge
As a general rule there can be no contractor's or laborer's lien upon
property unless the materials had been furnished and work and labor
had been done under a contract with the owner, either'express or
implied.1 Since the lien is statutory,2 and since the statute provides
that the lien was "for the payment of debts contracted" for work
done or material furnished, the North Carolina courts have found it
easy to hold that no lien can be created unless there is a contract with
the owner.3
Applying this statute and the above rule, the court held in an early
case that a contractor could not get a lien on a married woman's prop-
erty for work done or material furnished under a contract with the
husband. The court suggested that the law should be otherwise, but
that it was not within the power of the court to change it. 4 Following
this decision and probably as a result of the court's suggestion, the
General Assembly in 1901 amended the lien law so as to give a con-
tractor a lien on a married woman's property when it appeared that a
building was built or repaired thereon with her consent or procurement,
and in such cases she was deemed to have contracted for such im-
provements.5 There is no doubt that the statute prevented fraud and
injustice upon laborers and materialmen. The husband could improve
the wife's property and he could enjoy it without any possibility of
losing the improvements if he did not pay for them. Before the enact-
ment of the statute, the wife's property could be greatly enhanced in
value and she could enjoy these benefits at the expense of the material-
man.
While this statute remained on the books, the Supreme Court
recognized in a number of cases that the lands of a married woman
' Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932); Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Development
Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628 (1930); Charlotte Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Weathers v. Cox, 159 N. C.
575, 76 S. E. 7 (1912) ; Weathers v. Borders, 124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899);
Boone v. Chatfield, 118 N. C. 916, 24 S. E. 745 (1896).
'N .C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943). See also Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Develop-
ment Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628 (1930).
'Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Development Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628(1930); N. C. Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C. 377, 135 S. E. 115
(1926); Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924); Nicholson v.
Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S. E. 294 (1894).
'Weir v. Page, 109 N. C. 220, 13 S. E. 773 (1891).
This section [N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1] shall apply to the property of a mar-
ried woman when it shall appear that such building was built or repaired on her
land with her consent or procurement, and in such cases she shall be deemed to
have contracted for such improvements. N. C. CoDE ANlx. (Michie, 1939)
§2434.
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who knew that her husband was making improvements thereon might
be subjected to a laborer's or materialman's lien when the circumstances
surrounding the transaction indicated that she consented to or procured
the work to.be done.6 But, in 1943 when the General Statutes were
enacted, this amendment to the lien law which made the property of a
married woman subject to a lien was dropped as being obsolete in
view of the subsequent enactment of the Martin Act, 7 which gave the
married woman full power to contract ;8 but there seems to be no logi-
cal reason why the Martin Act made the amendment of 1901 obsolete.
It must be remembered that the amendment to the lien law was enacted
at a time when married women were under many legal disabilities and
their power to contract was limited in that she could make no contract
to affect her real estate without the consent of her husband., The
amendment made the married woman's property subject to a lien as if
she had contracted in order to satisfy the requirement that there must
be a debt from the owner of the property before there can be a lien.10
This covers the situation where the woman did not contract for the
improvements but some one else did for her. This seems to be entirely
different from the provision in the Martin Act which gives the mar-
ried woman herself the power to contract for labor or materials and to
deal with her property as if she were unmarried. It must also be
remembered that in 1901 a married woman could contract and deal
with her real property-the only requirement being that she had to get
the consent of her husband ;" thus there seems to be no overlap with
the 1901 amendment. It is believed, therefore, that an error was made
by dropping the amendment to the lien statute and as a result uncer-
tainty as to the present law has arisen and some lienors have been
caught unaware of the change by this backhanded method of repeal.
' Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924); Finch v. Cecil, 170
N. C. 72, 86 S. E. 992 (1915); Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747
(1911); Payne v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16 (1910); Finger v. Hunter,
130 N. C. 529, 41 S. E. 890 (1902).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943). "N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2434-
Deleted as obsolete. The Martin Act, enacted in 1911 (N. C. CODE ANN. §2507)
enables a married woman 'to contract and deal so as to affect her real and personal
property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were unmarried.'
In view of this, §2434 is now unnecessary." Explanatory Report of Committee on
Recodification.
'A married woman is authorized to contract and deal so as to affect her
real and personal property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she
were unmarried. N. C. Gai. STAT. §52-2 (1943).
' State v. Robinson, 143 N. C. 620, 56 S. E. 918 (1907); Ball v. Paquin, 140
N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410 (1905) ; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N. C. 529, 41 S. E. 890
(1902); Weathers v. Borden, 124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899); Pippen v.
Wesson, 74 N. C. 437 (1876).1 0Kearney v. Mann, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747 (1911).
N . C. Laws 1871-2, c. 193, §17. See also Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 437
(1876).
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At any rate, since the amendment of 1901 was dropped from the
1943 General Statutes, it appears that in regard to liens on her land
for labor and materials, she now stands on the same footing as any
other person. No other land owner has his land subjected to a lien for
labor or matdrials used unless he has contracted for them or has au-
thorized an agent to do so for him.12 In a recent case the court held
that "in order to create a lien in favor of a person who builds a house
on the land of another the circumstances must be such as to first create
the relationship of debtor and creditor."'13 Mere knowledge that work
is being done or material furnished does not enable a person furnishing
the labor or material to obtain a lien.' 4 Not even the land of a lessor is
subject to a lien for improvements made by the laborer or material-
man of the lessee when there is no evidence that the lessor contracted
to be obligated.' 5 In a recent case the court said that if the creditors
were unwilling to do the work and furnish the material upon the
credit of the debtor and intended to look to the security provided by
statute, ordinary prudence requires them to ascertain the status of the
title to the land upon which the building was to be erected and obtain the
approval or procurement of the owners.-' From these clearly estab-.
lished principles of lien law, and since the statute which provided that
a married woman was deemed to have contracted for the improvements
is no longer a part of our law, it seems that the separate estate of the
wife cannot be subjected to a lien for improvements placed thereon
by her husband unless she contracted with the husband constituting him
a sub-contractor or else made him her agent. If the present interpre-
tation of the lien statute is not extended it is difficult to see how a
laborer or materialman can get a lien on a married woman's property
when he contracted with the husband. Since the lien statutes are for
the primary protection of laborers and materialmen, in view of the
sound reasons for the enactment of the earlier statute, and to avoid
further confusion, it is suggested that the amendment of 1901 be
again made a part of our lien law.
PERRY C. HENSoN.
12Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Honeycutt v.
Kenilworth Development Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154, S. E. 628 (1930). See also
cases cited in note 1 and 2 supra.
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 246, 20 S. E. 2d 324, 326 (1942).
14 Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344. 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Critcher v. Wat-
son, 146 N. C. 150, 59 S. E. 544 (1907); Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N. C. 517 (1882).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
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Liens-Mechanics, Laborers, Materialmen-Acquisition and
Priorities
The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 states that: "The General
Assembly shall provide, by proper legislation, for giving to mechanics
and laborers an adequate lien on the subject matter of their labor."'
To comply with the constitutional mandate and to serve its purpose,
the General Assembly enacted what is now N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1
(1950).2 In addition to the constitutionally prescribed mechanic's and
laborer's liens, this statute also provides that there shall be a lien8 for
material furnished.4
The fundamental principle in lien law is that in order to have a lien
there must be between the parties an existent debt on a contract either
express or implied.6 This debt must have arisen by the furnishing of
labor or material, or both, 6 for the improvement of the property on
which the lien is to be acquired." In the case of each of these liens,
it is to be noted that the lien attaches to the property as improved and
not, as might be suspected in the case of the mechanic's and material-
man's liens, to the materials used in the improvement of the property.8
Thus the perfecting of a lien by a contractor, laborer or materialman
will ordinarily give him security well over the amount of his individual
claim.
In view of the fact that the lien attaches to the property, it is
apparent that the fundamental debt must exist between the prospective
N. C. CoNsT. Art. XIV §4.
' This note will contain a discussion of mechanic's, laborer's and materialman's
liens as acquired by independent contractors on real property. The rights of
subcontractors are not discussed in this note nor are the various other types of
liens provided for in the other sections of N. C. GEN. STAT. c. 44 (1943).3 When used in this note, the unmodified word lien shall mean lien as created
by N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943).
'The lien for material furnished as distinguished from the mechanic's and
laborer's liens is statutory only and is not provided for in the constitution. The
importance of this appears in the fact that N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §4 provides that
the mechanic's and laborer's liens can defeat the homestead exemption; whereas,
the materialman's lien being purely statutory cannot. Cameron v. McDonald, 216
N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939); Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E.
31 (1896) ; Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83 (1882) ; Aycock, Homestead Ex-
emptions in North Carolincn, 29 N. C. L. RFZv. 143, 153 (1950); Boyd, Some
Phases of Title Examinatioi and Real Estate Practice, 20 N. C. L. RiV. 169, 173
(1942).
'Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932) ; Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S.
E. 294 (1894).
'The mechanic's lien is broader than a lien for labor or material alone. The
mechanic's lien is for work done including both labor and material. Broyhill v.
Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896).
"Pocahontas Coal -Co. v. Henderson Light Co., 118 N. C. 232, 24 S. E. 22
(1896).
'Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. C . 337 (1879).
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lienor and the owner of the property against which the lien is sought.9
Therefore a person performing labor for, or furnishing material to,
a lessee or a tenant may be unable to secure a lien against the property
unless he can show that the lessee or tenant had authority to contract
for the owner.1 0 Thus from the rule that one may not be made a
debtor without his consent, it follows that a man's property may not
be made subject to a lien without his consent, express or implied.
When the laborer has rendered services for, or the materialman has
furnished material to, the owner of the premises under a contract ex-
press or implied, the debtor-creditor relationship arises; and, the laborer
or materialman is now in a position to perfect his lien. In order to
perfect his lien, the laborer or materialman must file a claim of lien "in
the office of the superior court clerk in any county where the labor has
been performed or the materials furnished."'" This notice of lien in
order to be effective must be filed "within six months after the com-
pletion of the labor or the final furnishing of materials.' 2 Failure to
file within this specified time constitutes a fatal forfeiture of the right
to the lien.' 3
When does the filing period of six months begin to run? By N. C.
GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1950),14 the filing period runs from the com-
pletion of the labor or the final furnishing of material. In this respect
it becomes important to determine if the contract is "entire and in-
divisible."'5
Suppose 0 in building a house orders a certain quantity of brick
from B. It is delivered on April 1. On April 7, 0 orders other brick
from B. This is delivered on April 10. Then on May 1, pursuant to
another such order, B delivers certain other brick. B on October 15 files
notice of lien with the clerk of the court claiming a lien for the whole
amount due for the three orders of brick. In an action to enforce this
lien, the lienor, B will find that he has no lien at all on the orders of
brick delivered April 1 and April 10; whereas, he will find that the
lien is effective as to the amount due on the May 1 delivery. The rea-
son is that B delivered brick to 0 under three separate order and
delivery contracts, and not under an entire and indivisible contract.
'Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932); Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20
S. E. 294 (1894).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-38 (1943).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943).
"'Atlas Supply Co. v. McCurry, 199 N. C. 799, 156 S. E. 91 (1930).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943): "Notice of lien shall be filed as herein-
before provided . . . at any time within six months after the completion of the
labor or the final furnishing of the materials... .
"Sides v. Tidwell, 216 N. C. 480, 5 S. E. 2d 316 (1939); King v. Elliott,
197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
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Hence, since the filing period of six months runs from the delivery of
each separate order and since here it has run as to the first two orders,
no lien for the amount of the first two orders was acquired by the sub-
sequent filing.
Instead of the above situation, suppose B and 0 had entered a con-
tract whereby B was to furnish a fixed quantity of brick for the con-
struction of the house with deliveries to be on April 1, April 10, and
May 1; and subsequently B filed his notice of lien on October 15. In
this case B perfected his lien for the entire amount due on all three
deliveries as he filed notice within six months of the final furnishing
of material under an entire and indivisible contract. 16
With performance complete under a contract, a debt arises. For
each such debt there is a corresponding right to a lien. Accordingly,
the filing period as to each particular debt and its corresponding lien
runs from the moment the prospective lienor completes performance
under each particular contract.
With the filing of sufficient notice1 7 the mechanic, laborer, or ma-
terialman has perfected his lien.18 Once a lienor has perfected his
lien, the lien relates back and becomes effective as of the time of the
initial furnishing of material or the initial performance of labor under
the contract on which the lien is founded.19
In Burr v. Maultsbyo the plaintiff furnished material and per-
formed labor in repair of property of defendant A. Subsequent to the
completion of this labor and the final furnishing of material, defendant
A conveyed the property to defendant B who took for value and with-
out notice of the plaintiff's claim. The deed from defendant A to
defendant B was duly recorded. Subsequent to these transactions and
within the statutory time allowed, plaintiff filed notice of lien. The
court held that the lien related back to the first furnishing of materials
or performance of labor; and, therefore, the conveyance from defend-
ant A to defendant B was subject to and inferior to the plaintiff's
lien.
16 King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
'The problem of sufficiency of notice will not 'be discussed in this note. On
this point see N. C. GEN STAT. §44-38 (1943); King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93,
147 S. E. 701 (1929); Fulp v. Kernersville Light Co., 157 N. C. 157, 72 S. E.
867 (1911) ; Cook v. Cobb, 101 N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888).18 Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
"King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929) ; Harris v. Cheshire,
189 N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925); McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167
N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E.
794 (1896); McNeal Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N. C. 615, 16 S. E.
857 (1892); Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E.
35 (1891) ; Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888) ; Chadbourn v.
Williams, 71 N. C. 444 (1874).
' 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
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In King v. Elliott21 plaintiff furnished material under an entire and
indivisible contract on the dates of July 2, July 15, August 1, and
August 22. Defendant Elliott executed a deed of trust on the property
to the defendant bank as trustee and it was recorded August 1. The
plaintiff lienor filed notice of lien on December 31. Here again the
court held that since the lien related back to the initial furnishing of
material, the materialman's lien was superior to the deed of trust
recorded subsequent to the initial furnishing of materials, yet recorded
prior to the filing of notice of the materialman's lien. Thus it appears
that one taking a mortgage or deed of trust, or purchasing property
cannot rely on the registrations in the lien docket 22 but rather has
the burden of making inquiry as to the existence of potential liens
yet unrecorded but for which there is still time for the lienor to file
notice as required by the statute.23
In McAdams v. Piedmwnt Trust Co. 2 4 plaintiff and defendant A
entered a construction contract on June 14. On July 20 a deed of trust
executed by defendant A to defendant B as trustee was properly
recorded. Labor and materials were first furnished by the plaintiff on
August 7. The court consistent, with other decisions, held that the lien
related back to the initial furnishing of labor and materials and did
not relate back to the date of the contract. Further, the proper and
prior registration of the deed of trust was notice to the plaintiff con-
tractor, and therefore his lien was subject to and inferior to the deed
of trust.
In Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Riverbark,2 5 plaintiff furnished
material to a lessee who had an option to buy. Subsequently, the lessee
took up the option giving a deed of trust to the seller to secure the
purchase price. It was held that the sale with the purchase money deed
of trust back was as a single transaction; the title passed too quickly
for the lien to attach. It may also be reasoned that no lien had been
established. There must be a debt between the lienor and the owner for
a lien to be established. North Carolina being a "title" jurisdiction the
mortgagee is formally the owner, holding the legal title. Since the sale
with the purchase money deed of trust given back is an instantaneous
transaction, the seller-owner after such a transaction becomes the
mortgagee-owner. Since there is no debt as between the material fur-
nisher and the seller-mortgagee-owner, there can be no lien. As to
subsequent encumbrances on the property, the materialman's lien would
be in full force and effect.
" 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
" For further discussion in respect to title examination see Boyd, Some Phases
of Title Examination and Real Estate Practice, 20 N. C. L. Ray. 169, 173 (1942).
2- N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943).
2 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
2-231 N. C. 213, 56 S. E. 2d 431 (1949).
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In reaching the solution as to priority between two or more me-
chanic's, laborer's or materialman's liens, the North Carolina General
Assembly has provided a statute26 directly covering the problem.
This statute ekplicitly provides that "liens created and established by
this chapter shall be paid and settled according to the priority of the
notice of the lien filed with . .. the clerk."'27 In Boykinr v. Logan28
it was held that as between parties furnishing labor or materials and
acquiring liens, each of which is properly filed, that lien is superior
which is first filed notwithstanding the fact that the debt giving rise to
this superior lien was not incurred until after the furnishing of labor
or materials giving rise to the later filed liens.20
Thus as long as the contest is between a single statutory lien and
one or more contract encumbrances, or between two or more statutory
liens, absent any contract encumbrances, the law is explicit. To make
a generalization from the above, the law is cleai in any case involving
the priority as between statutory liens and contract liens in any numbers
provided that all of the statutory liens considered individually bear
the same priority relationship to the various contract liens. In a
situation where all of the statutory liens do not bear the same relation.
ship to the contract liens, i.e., one in which a contract lien intervenes
between two or more statutory liens, the application of the existent
North Carolina law produces an anomalous situation.3 0
Suppose pursuant to a contract between A and 0, A furnished
building materials on April 1. On April 15, a deed of trust executed
by 0 to B as trustee was recorded. On May 1, C performed labor for
O pursuant to an independent contract. On May 15, C filed notice of
his lien; and on June 1, A filed notice of his lien. Since 0 had become
insolvent, and his property was not sufficient to pay off the three claims,
the problem before the court is which claim shall be superior.
As between A and B, by application of the rule of relation back
to the date of the initial furnishing of materials, the materialman's lien
of A is superior to the deed of trust subsequently recorded.8 ' As be-
tween B's deed of trust and C's laborer's lien, the deed of trust is
superior, having been properly recorded before the performance of
labor by C;32 and, thereby, C's lien is subject to the deed of trust. If
2 N. C. Gzx STAT. §44-40 (1943).27 N. C. GzN STAT. §44-40 (1943).203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932).
29 For example, A furnishes materials on April 1, and B furnishes materials on
May 1. B files notice of lien on June 1, and then A files notice of his lien on
July 1. Having been recorded first, B's lien is superior to that of A's.
"0 OSBORNF, MORTGAGES 567 (1951).
" King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929); Burr v. Maultsby,
99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
" McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
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this were the whole story, the liens of A, B, and C would rank in this
order of preference. But by applying the statute3 3 and its interpreta-
tion in the Boykin case, notice of C's lien having been filed prior to
the filing of notice of A's lien, C's lien is superior. Thus there is a
vicious circle with each claim at the same time being both superior and,
inferior to the other two claims.
This problem, or problems closely related hereto, has been passed
on in several jurisdictions having lien laws similar to those of North
Carolina. 34 The decisions of these jurisdictions that have passed on
the problem fall into two categories. One group of decisions35 by a
strict and literal construction of the lien statutes holds that all of the
statutory lien claimants should be preferred over the intervening con-
tract lien claimants. The other group of decisions36 holds that an inter-
vening contract encumbrance creates by its intervention different classes
of statutory liens. By applying the relation back rule, it is determined
which liens are superior to the contract lien and which are inferior.3 7
Then, as between these statutory lienors in each class, the priorities will
be determined by applying the usual rule3s as between lien claimants
generally, to each class separately. The reasoning behind these deci-
sions grouping the liens into classes is that the lien which- is subsequent
to and inferior to the contract lien can attach only to the interest of
the owner as of the time the lien is acquired. And, likewise, the lien
superior to the contract lien attaches to the property unencumbered
by the subsequent contract lien.
Though this anomalous situation has never been presented directly
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, one of the following solutions
may be proper, should such a case arise. First, the court might invoke
the class theory. To reach the solution, the court should first apply
the relation back rule to the various liens and thereby establish the
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-40 (1943).
"Pacific States Saving, Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 83 P.
513 (1905) ; Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910) ; Gardner v. Leck,
52 Minn. 522, 54 N. W. 746 (1893) ; Finlayson v. Crooks, 47 Minn. 74, 49 N. W.
398 (1891); Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N. W.
643 (1893) ; Meister v. J. Meister, Inc., 103 N. J. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928).
"Gardner v. Leck, 52 Minn. 522, 54 N. W. 746 (1893); Finlayson v. Crooks,
47 Minn. 74, 49 N. W. 398 (1891).
"Pacific States Saving, Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 83 P.
513 (1905) ; Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910) ; Henry & Coats-
worth Co. v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N. W. 643 (1893); Meister v. J.
Meister Inc., 103 N. J. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928).
"'Meister v. J. Meister, Inc., 103 N. 3. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928). "Some
lien claims therefore may be prior to the mortgage, and some subsequent, as
here. This divides the lien claims into two classes."
" In some jurisdictions, the statutory lien claimants share pro rata in the
distribution of the debtor's assets; whereas, in other jurisdictions as in North
Carolina, the lien claimants take priority in the order in which they file their
notices of lien.
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classes of liens which are superior or inferior to the intervening con-
tract lien. After the liens have been grouped into classes, the court
should construe N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-40 (1943) to the effect that the
word liens as used in this priority statute means liens of the same class,
and apply it to determine the priority of the various liens within the
individual classes.3 09
Second, the court might dispense with its long established doctrine
of relation back.40 It is true that this rule has time and again been
sanctioned, 41 and there would probably be great hesitancy on the part
of the court to overturn its past ruling. There are some good reasons,
however, that stand in favor of such a reversal by the court. It it true
that Burr v. Maultsby42 takes the position that the filing of notice of lien
is not an essential element to the establishing of a lien effective during
the 6 months' filing period, nor is this necessary in order for the lien to
take precedence over a contract lien recorded subsequently to the first
furnishing of material or performance of labor. By interpreting the
language of the court in the light of the decision it appears that the
court is of the opinion that the purpose of the filing of the notice of
lien is to give the lien life and efficacy after the expiration of the period
of filing. This places the filing of notice of lien in the position of a
condition precedent to the survival of the lien after the passage of the
statutory time for filing.
But in Cook v. Cobb,43 where the labor was performed and notice
of lien filed and subsequently the property was attached and sold for
another indebtedness, the court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
notice as filed, held that the purpose of the notice of lien is to put the
public on notice of the lien established. 44 If indeed the purpose of the
" A statutory amendment could quite simply accomplish the same result.
An amendment would not, however, be necessary.
" This doctrine of relation back applying to liens was first propounded in
1874. Warren v, Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874); Chadburn v. Williams, 71
N. C. 444 (1874).
41 Cases cited note 19 supra.
42 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
"101 N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888).
""The obvious purpose of this requirement is to give public notice, in the
offices designated, of the plaintiff's 'claim-his debt-the amount of it, the ma-
terials' supplied or the labor done, when done, on what property, on what farm or
crop, and when, specified in such detail and certainty as will give reasonable
notice to all persons of the character of the 'claim,' and the property to which
the lien, on account of the same, attaches, and of the lien thereby established.
"Otherwise, such filing of the claim and notice thereof and the lien, would
serve no useful purpose, and it would be practically nugatory." Cook v. Cobb,
101 oN. C. 68, 70, 7 S. E. 700, 701 (1888).
Speaking of the lienor's advantage, this court said: If he is to have such
advantage other creditors should know the fact, and the extent of it, to the
end they may have just opportunity the better to determine what extent of
credit the employer should have, and what property of his they might expect to
subject to the payment of their debt against him."
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filing of notice of lien is to give notice to creditors of any prior encum-
brances upon the property of the debtor, how can this view be reconciled
with the fact that if a lienor has furnished labor or material before the
recording of a subsequent contract lien and who files after the recording
of the contract lien and within the time for filing, the lien is superior to
the contract lien even though the contract lienor had no notice actual or
constructive of the existence of the lien?
The relation back doctrine when first applied, was predicated on N.
C. CODE (1883) §178245 in 1874.46 The doctrine was again applied
by referring to the same statute in 1888. 47 This statute was general
applying to work on crops, farms, and for materials furnished;48 and
by direct implication it required the relation back rule. In the REvIsAL
OF 1905, the statute was modified so as to restrict its application to
liens for work done on crops. 49 Notwithstanding this change, the
court has continued to apply the relation back rule to mechanic's, la-
borer's, or materialman's liens on subject matter other than work done on
crops."0 Thus the rule still stands even though its statutory founda-
tion has been removed.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-38 (1943) is a further argument for abandon-
ing the relation back doctrine. Its emphasis is upon the time of filing
rather than on the time of the initial furnishing, on the detail with
which notice is to be filed. The degree of detail required would seem
to be indicative of the legislature's intent that this notice should be
directed to subsequent creditors of any class seeking security in the
property of the owner-debtor. N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943) ex-
pressly provides that as between lien claimants the date of the filing of
their notices of lien determines the priority. N. C. GEN,. STAT. §44-42
(1943) rl also indicates the emphasis that the statutes place on the filing
of the notice of the lien.
Thus it seems that there are good grounds on which a repudiation
'N. C. Laws 1869-70, c. 206, §2.
"Warren v. Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874); Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N.
C. 444 (1874).
"'Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
48 N. C. CODE (1883) §1782: "The lien for work on crops or farms or ma-
terials given by this chapter shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance,
which attached upon the property subsequent to the time at which the work
was commenced or the materials were furnished"
"' N. C. REVISAL OF 1905 §2034: "The lien for work on crops given by this
chapter shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance which attached
to the crops subsequent to the time at which the work was commenced."
" King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929); Harris v. Cheshire,
189 N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925) ; McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C.
494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-42 (1943): "Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to affect the rights of any person to whom any debt may be due for any
work done for which priority of claim is flied with the proper officer."
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the relation back rule may be based. With such a repudiation of
the relation back rule, priority, as between liens and contract liens or
any combination thereof, would simply depend on the times of the
filing of notices of lien or recording of the contract liens.
Furthermore, in Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church,52 the
court held, in deciding a venue question, that as far as an interest in
real property is concerned there is no essential difference between a
statutory lien and a contract lien.52 Hence, there is little reason why
the recordation of statutory liens and the recordation of contract liens
should not be given the same effect. This would make the rules easy
of application and produce uniformity in lien law generally.
WILLIAm H. BonBirr, JR.
Pleading-Unnecessary Allegations in Answer-Motion to Strike
Plaintiff instituted an action against defendant administrator to com-
pel defendant to pay plaintiff, as sole distributee, assets of the estate of
one Arsemus Chandler. Plaintiff alleged that he was born of the mar-
riage between Arsemus Chandler and Della Fender Hensley and is the
son and only heir of Arsemus Chandler. The defendant specifically
denied this allegation and for further answer and defense set out
matter to the effect that plaintiff was born to Della Fender more than
two years after she and Arsemus Chandler separated and that plaintiff
was not the son of Arsemus Chandler. In apt time plaintiff moved to
strike this further answer and defense. The motion was overruled. In
an opinion by Justice Winborne the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed saying;
"The plea of denial controverts and raises an issue of fact between the
parties as to each material allegation denied, and forces the plaintiff to
prove them.. . . averments of evidence which defendant contends sustain
his denial of the controverted facts are irrelevant as pleading and have
no place in the answer .... 1
This decision seems inconsistent with an earlier case where the
allegation sought to be stricken was but an, elaboration of the denial
previously made. The trial judge refused to strike the unnecessary
allegation. The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that since under the
denial the evidence would be competent with or without the explanatory
-2226 N. C. 171, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
"'And we see no essential difference in so far as an interest in real property
is involved, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a lien created by contract, and
in one to foreclose a specific statutory lien on real property." Penland v,
Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N. C. 171, 173, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
' Chandler v. Mashburn, 233 N. C. 277, 63 S. E. 2d 553 (1951).
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allegation, it was doubtful whether the ruling affected such a sub-
stantial right as to be appealable.2
In the present case counsel for plaintiff urged that the matter was
irrelevant; that his client would be prejudiced3 by its retention in the
pleadings; and that therefore the case fell within the "irrelevant and
prejudicial" rule of Hinson v. Britt.4 Quaere, however, as to whether
the court considered the Hinson case controlling in this case. 5
The court's reference to the facts alleged therein as irrelevant does
not mean that they are irrelevant to the issue at hand, for the opposite
is clearly true. The allegations are irrelevant only in the sense that
they are unnecessary. Nor did the court indicate that the plaintiff
would be injured by the retention of the matter in the pleadings
(unless it be assumed that the reversal of an interlocutory ruling neces-
sarily implies prejudice). 6
Thus it appears that for the first time the court has squarely held
that it is improper pleading to allege affirmatively matter which could
be presented in evidence under a general denial.
The rule appears to be a sound one and if followed it will force a
'Teasly v. Teasly, 205 N. C. 604, 172 S. E. 197 (1937). See also, Virginia
Trust Company v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938).
'The possibility of prejudice cannot successfully be advanced as a ground
for the motion to strike. Parker v. Duke University, 230 N. C. 656, 657, 55 S. E.
2d 189, 190 (1949). Tar Heel Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 189 N. C.
596, 152 S. E. 794 (1930). See Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike
Pleadings in North Carolha, 29 N. C. L. Rv. 3 (1950). After the motion has
been denied on some proper ground, the trial court will be reversed only on a
showing of prejudice. Hinson v. Britt, 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950).
In passing it is interesting to note that most of the few cases where the trial
judge has been reversed for failure to strike involved allegations of matter that
clearly would have been incompetent as evidence. Parlier v. Drum 231 N. C.
155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949) ; Parish v. Atlantic Coast Line I. R. 221 N. C. 292,
20 S. E. 2d 299 (1942) ; Sayles v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940);
Duke v. Crippled Children's Commission, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938).
' 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950). "The court does not correct errors
of the Superior Court unless such errors prejudicially affect the substantial rights
of the party appealing. Hence the denying or overruling of a motion to strike
matter from a pleading under the provisions of G. S. 1-153 is not ground for
reversal unless the record affirmatively reveals these two things: (1) That the
matter is irrelevant or redundant; and (2) that its retention in the pleading will
cause harm or injustice to the moving party." Followed in Buchanan v. Dicker-
son, Inc., 232 N. C. 421, 61 S. E. 2d 187 (1950).
'The court makes no reference to the Hinson case or to the earlier cases
where it has attempted to resolve what matter is irrelevant as pleading and when
it will be stricken. For an exhaustive discussion of these cases see, Brandis and
Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings in North Carolina, 29 N. C. L. RPFv.
3 (1950).
"In an appeal from an interlocutory order which does not destroy, impair,
or seriously imperil some substantial right of appellant, unless corrected before
the trial, this court, ordinarily, will not interfere with the order entered."
Light Co. v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 332, 56 S. E. 2d 602 (1949).
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decided change in the widely prevalent practice among attorneys of
denying an allegation and then setting out at great length a differing
version of the facts. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that many
attorneys will bother to object to this type of pleading so long as the
matter contained in the allegation is not really harmful to their clients.
The old forms will probably continue to be used and tolerated to a great
extent.
EARL W. VAUGHN.
